About the issue

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*Christina Saadalla and Elizabeth Storer*

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This journal issue presents emerging and novel approaches to Innovative Governance across the African Continent. Whilst the practice of international development often depoliticises and eventalises crisis across the continent, this scholarship examines the extent to which such crises are imbricated in processes of governance and politics. Such an interrogation is intended to focus not upon the failures of governance, as is the tendency with much policy literature, but to refocus our attention to potential entry points to develop strategies of innovative governance across multiple scales. Such strategies may involve new technologies, or incorporate local ideas of democratisation and justice.

Whilst we have confidence in much development rhetoric, this journal provides insights into the needs to provide an evidence base for our received wisdom, and the need to re-assess the assumptions involved in international approaches to governance. Whilst there is little doubt that “Africa is rising”, there is an urgent need to examine how rising growth rates and income levels translate into equitable development and incorporate the poor. The globalised terrain of development and business affords great opportunity to reform and transform governance practices, and the 2015 Africa Summit aims to stimulate discussions as to how such opportunities can be actualised.

Christina Saadalla and Elizabeth Storer
Understanding how business is perceived ‘on the street’:
Investigating the rules that govern economic life in Nigeria

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Abstract
The objective of this research is to explore the complexity of business development in Nigeria by analysing how business is defined, understood and enacted ‘on the street’, namely, by small entrepreneurs in an urban context. It aims to carve a path for a deeper understanding of how Nigeria functions in reality in order to let the social context determine what kind of economic interventions are possible, rather than relying on aid or microfinance to bring about development. It will also build upon the limited entrepreneurial studies carried out in Sub-Saharan Africa, taking into account how business relations actually occur and function in their societies. This objective will be achieved via the detailed analysis of a particular urban space, looking at how different actors relate to each other to survive; and, on a wider scale, how these actors promote the economic development of the place where they live through daily interactions.

This study will be undertaken through an ethnographical analysis, with the aid of other qualitative methodologies such as in-depth interviews. This approach is adopted because, although there is an increasing interest in research on the topic of entrepreneurship, very little analysis has been done regarding the rules that govern economic life in Nigeria. By exploring the social themes that have already been identified through a pilot study conducted by this author, this research seeks to extend our understanding of policy interventions that can be undertaken in a specific urban economic space. Subjective issues such as ethics, values, morality, legitimacy and age will be emphasised through their impact on economic development.
BACKGROUND
The initial aim of this research was to analyse the potential for sustainable economic development in Nigeria, particularly through a 'social entrepreneurship' perspective. Scholars, policy makers and social commentators have repeatedly proposed an enabling environment for social enterprise as a solution to economic development in Africa. However, what emerged from the initial stages of the research was a widespread heterogeneity of the concept of social entrepreneurship. This insight has spawned a new direction for this research, which seeks to understand how business proceeds 'on the street'. In this light, this study will explore the complexity of business development by analysing how incomes are generated in an urban context and by identifying the unwritten rules that govern economic life in Nigeria. This study will explore how businesses are constructed, what they do in practice, what effects they have beyond their stated aims and how are they perceived and experienced by ordinary Nigerians: Who trades with whom? How do businesses determine price? What non-economic issues come into play? What is actually happening 'on the street'? These are some of the key questions that will be explored in this study.

CONTEXT
It is constantly stated by scholars, within and outside the country, that Nigeria should not be poor considering the amount of petro-dollars that have accrued since it first discovered oil in 1956 and from its abundant natural resources (Pleskovic and Stern, 2000; Obadan, 2002; Omotola, 2008; Oshewolo, 2010, Okosun et al, 2012). In addition, Nigeria is the eighth highest exporter of oil per day in the world, and it has been one of the top exporters since the 1960s (Igwe et al, 2003). However, the latest figures from the National Bureau of Statistics (2012) put the country's relative poverty rate at 69%, or 112 million people, as of 2010.

For many years, the reduction of poverty and the attainment of economic growth have been a key policy concern in Nigeria, and various governments devised interventions to achieve this objective. The literature mentions several programmes adopted by successive governments, which include: the National Accelerated Food Production Programme (NAFPP), the Family Economic Advancement Programme (FEAP), the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), the People’s Bank of Nigeria (PBN), Community Banking (CB), the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) and several others (Iganiga, 2007; Acha, 2012; Garba et al., 2013). Even with the implementation of many of these programmes, the country still witnessed an increase in percentage of people living in poverty. The evidence presented in the literature suggests that their impact was not felt by the citizens and that the majority, if not all, of the interventions failed to achieve their purpose (Okosun et al., 2012; Oshewolo, 2010; Ebimbowe et al., 2012; Iganiga, 2007; Obadan, 2002).

Most of the interventions might have been capable of alleviating poverty and bringing economic growth, but many reasons have been put forward for the cause of the failures. Possible explanations include an insufficient focus on the poor as part of the intervention policy (Obadan, 2002), the political instability that was prevalent in the country (Oshewolo, 2010), the inappropriate implementation of the interventions (Ntunde and Oteh, 2011) and widespread corruption (Ugoh and Ukpere, 2009). In fairness to the policy makers, these are not the only reasons which contributed to the failure of the policies. In light of these limitations, one of the programmes, the NAPEP, launched in 2001, was expected to be different, as it was a policy pushed by the newly democratic government. The programme implied that the reliance on microfinance institutions, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and an enabling environment for businesses to flourish would constitute a viable means to achieve growth (Iganiga, 2007; Ebimbowe et al., 2012). It was also suggested that the programme would have the potential for poverty reduction, as it was thought that the poor would become more entrepreneurial via access to credit — a belief supported by the success of microfinance initiatives witnessed in other parts of the world (Okonjo-Iweala, 2005).

Wennekers and Thurik (1999) provide extensive literature on the relationship between entrepreneurship and economic performance. While much of this literature suggests that entrepreneurship contributes to economic growth, few empirical analyses actually prove this link. Wong et al. (2005) are also of the opinion that a rise in the
The number of entrepreneurs should lead to economic growth, due to a link between new business formation and job creation. However, it can also be argued that there exist people out of the employment market who are engaged in businesses that might not necessarily generate growth for the economy, which according to Wong et al. (2005) could be common in countries such as Nigeria. Whatever the case may be, the financing of new business and entrepreneurship is often seen as key to poverty reduction.

Recognising this need for provision of access to credit to poor and low-income households in order to spur entrepreneurship, the new ‘microfinance policy’ was introduced in 2005 by the government for commercial banks and formal financial institutions. Although community banks already existed in Nigeria to meet the needs of this segment of the population, they were then directed to convert to microfinance banks (Ebimbowe et al., 2012; Iganiga, 2007). The policy’s principal objectives included: promoting mainstreaming of the informal sub-sector into the national financial system; contributing to rural transformation and promoting linkage programmes between universal banks, specialised institutions and microfinance institutions.

Like most of the other interventions mentioned, critics have pointed to the failures of this microfinance policy, mostly because it does not fulfil one of its major objectives: the creation of access to credit for small business. In fact, the microfinance institutions hardly loaned to any individuals, after being forced by the Central Bank of Nigeria to recapitalise (Abraham and Balogun, 2012). Although the microfinance policy might be regarded as failed or failing, we must continue to carefully observe its more recent developments.

This paper also argues that the importation or adoption of Western economic development models vastly overestimates the efficacy of such interventions on the receiving economy. Different suggestions have been put forward as possible solutions to poverty alleviation and economic growth, including the promotion of non-profit organisations, especially those that are community-based or led by local business actors (Emmanuel, 2012; Sesan et al., 2012); the promotion of entrepreneurship (Igwe et al., 2012); redesigning the country’s education curriculum (Onu et al., 2013) and the promotion of government and private sector partnerships (Ogbu, 2012).

Despite such policy recommendations, not many academics have gone to the ‘streets’ to truly understand what is happening in Nigeria. While many have looked at the impact of NGOs (Smith, 2010) and community-based organisations in the economy (Abegunde, 2009) or at the role of microfinance institutions in promoting economic growth (Douglas, 2012), they never really investigated how business is conducted ‘on the street’, nor tried to understand bottom-up, income-generating activities. Researchers have usually started from offering a theoretical definition, before going out in the field to find out what exists in reality. Sometimes, they have attempted to replicate a successful approach achieved in another country into the Nigerian context (Okonjo-Iweala, 2005). What this study will propose, on the other hand, is not a broad overview of business creation, but a detailed analysis of how business and economics work in practice in the Nigerian context. This research presents a journey in the process of ‘self-discovery’ for Nigeria, which is not based on prior notions as to what will work best, but constitutes an attempt to discover practical solutions through empirical investigation (Kwon and Kang, 2011).

As Hubbard put it: ‘Facts aren’t just out there. Every fact has a factor…’ (1988, p. 5). Therefore, researchers have to search for the factors that can explain economic behaviours in this setting. Why is Nigeria the way it is? What roles do the majority of Nigerians play in their economic situation? Why are non-profit community-based organisations and similar initiatives being preached as the most viable solutions for economic development? What do we actually know about how they interact in their economic space and how they got there? How do they trade with each other, and what non-economic issues arise? Investigating these issues can certainly prove helpful when coming up with an adequate policy intervention. The most important issue at hand is the existence of a wide range of actors engaged in economic activities that are not yet properly understood. A fuller understanding of their activities is necessary before a poverty-reduction policy or intervention can be established. Economic growth measures could be problematic, but when we look at people on the streets of Nigeria we find they are engaged in various activities that might be classified as entrepreneurial and have the potential to lead to economic growth. This research focuses on economic behavior for two reasons: because this behavior influences economic actions,
and because economic actions in turn influence economic growth — which development economists too often try to achieve by proposing the adoption of successful models from other environments.

**METHODOLOGY**

An ethnographic approach was chosen as a suitable method in conducting the study. As Prasad (2005) noted, it is important to understand how individuals act and reflect in all situations. According to Atkinson *et al.* (2001), ethnography can offer a strong advantage by offering first-hand experience and understanding a particular social setting on the basis of participant observation. Although observation and participation are known to be major characteristics of ethnography, they are often accompanied by other methods and techniques to derive maximum results (Kawulich, 2005). In the case of this research, in-depth interviews have been conducted via a semi-structured interview approach with primarily open-ended questions. The interviews were mostly conducted in English and local dialects. Respondents were encouraged to speak in the language in which they felt most comfortable, following the recommendations of Temple and Young (2004). A snowballing technique was used to refer to other actors that could be important to the research.

The study was set on Allen Avenue, a main commercial street in Lagos, Nigeria. The choice of locality was driven by the richness of information and material previously obtained via several informal interviews by the author on themes regarding alternative constituents of human and social capital — including age, network, identity, ‘freedom’ (length of apprenticeship) and trust, among others. During these initial interviews, several aspects of human and social capital on the ground in Lagos were mentioned, leading to the decision to focus on an in-depth analysis in this relatively small area. This area is also interesting because it includes a number of key Nigerian tribes who work alongside each other. It also contains a varying mix of business categories ranging from retail banks to medium-scale enterprises to street and kiosk traders — and it probably has a large informal sector. There are churches and mosques in the area, as well as various government institution offices such as the tax office and a local government office. Furthermore, behind the main street there is a residential area inhabited by both lower and middle classes. Although no single locality is able to fully capture the complexity of an economy or the whole spectrum of Nigerian entrepreneurship, the selected area aims to capture as much variety as possible, offering an entry point into varieties of spaces and scales of economic activity in the country.

Fieldwork was conducted for a total of seven months. Interviews were conducted with business owners, shop workers and apprentices, street vendors, local government officials, bank staff and a few residents of the area. The research methodology allowed for an observation of the variation of business categories that operate in the same area and how they interrelate by observing respondents, in the market place, in their shops and also on the busy street of Allen Avenue, engaging with passers-by. Moreover, the study explored how businesses are constructed — namely, identifying the factors that informed entrepreneurs’ choice of business — what they do in practice, what effects they have beyond their stated aims, and how they are they perceived and experienced by ordinary Nigerians. Who trades with whom? How do businesses determine prices? What non-economic issues come into play? What is actually happening ‘on the street’?

Interviews took place during daytime working hours, and were mostly conducted in shops, business premises or in public places. Data gathered include, but are not limited to: income and expenditure of the participants; information regarding their daily activities; methods used for raising capital for their business; use of microfinance banks; participation in credit societies; respect and enforcement of government regulations; methods to attract customers and to display goods for sale; hiring of staff workers and employment terms and existing modes of payment amongst members of the community.
**Findings and Discussion**

This section analyses the empirical data and begins to explore some of the key findings regarding how business is defined, understood and enacted ‘on the street’ of Lagos. It particularly focuses on how businesses manage the challenges of access to credit and the rule of law during their daily business operations through trust and personal relations. Most of the excerpts used for the analysis are from narratives elicited in response to open-ended questions about business-related actions, such as ‘How did you raise the funds for your business?’ The responses to such questions can help achieve a better understanding of the workings and the rules that govern economic life ‘on the street’.

Using direct observation and numerous interviews, it was possible to analyse the ways in which entrepreneurs build and establish credibility amongst themselves and how they navigate these different trust dynamics. As the research shows, trust and trust-building plays a central role in business operations in Nigeria. A major aim of this section is therefore also to illustrate how trust relations are leveraged and how this has shaped the ways in which individuals raise capital for their business, where market elders are duty-bound to raise finances for apprentices in the same market. It will also outline the development of a culture in which business owners are duty-bound to employ family members, but also do so as a means of employing staff members they can trust. The section will begin with how economic actors in this context go about the business operation of employment, and, from there, lead into access to finance.

**Employee-employer trust relations**

Firstly, it was observed that it is a common occurrence for small businesses and traders to hire relatives as members of staff or shop assistants. As much as this serves as a flexible labour force for the business owners, it also ensures that they work with a trusted person. It also fits into the existing system of apprenticeship. This is not a novel observation, and has been covered extensively by the family business literature (Sharma et al., 2007). However, in the case of Nigeria it has a different occurrence, underlined by tales of compulsion and of necessary responsibility. This section will proceed to outline how employees and employers build trust amongst each other.

Since Nigeria’s small business owners face the problem of not being able to afford to conduct background checks on prospective employees, a system exists whereby employers request guarantors. This still offers insufficient assurance, as checks are hardly ever also performed on the guarantors. The following is a conversation with Godwin 1, an electronic retailer, who has been in operation for 10 years. He explains why he has his nephews and relatives working with him and why the guarantor system does not ensure any form of safety.

**Q:** Which of your boys is up for freedom² soon?

**A:** Up for freedom how? I am not letting any of them leave now. I told Nonso and Chika³ yesterday that they cannot leave just yet; I will speak to their Dad.

See, it is difficult to get trustworthy sales boy[s], see what is happening to Mr Opara, last week 12 ACs went missing, since then we have not seen Demola. They tried to call the number of the guarantor, it was a wrong number, even the address, and nobody knows where that is in this small Lagos.

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1 Names have been changed for the purposes of this research.
2 ‘Freedom’ is a term used among informal business in Nigeria for when apprentices come to the end of their service. The length of service depends on the trade.
3 Nonso and Chika are Godwin’s nephews.
Q: Has the case been reported to the police?

A: This is how I know you are not from here [laughs]. What will they do? If anybody reports matter to the police, trust me it is just for the sake of the record.

Q: So are you saying you can only employ relatives? But not all your staff members are your relatives.

A: Most of them are related to me, and those that are not were introduced to me by a family relative. I have learnt my lesson in this business. Mr Eze taught me about getting a letter from a guarantor, but do not forget, this is a letter that can be easily forged; apart from that, with the way Lagos is not properly mapped, how will I be able to locate the person’s address, or even if I do, what if this guarantor dies, or what if the guarantor moves from that address? My brother let me save myself the stress and employ a relative. Although that comes with its downside, because if Nonso’s dad calls me for money I cannot lie that I do not have, his son will tell him the truth. So for me I do it 50/50: some close relatives, others referred to by a relative. (Godwin NR18)

The question that elicits this response introduces an entirely different concept, known as ‘freedom’, which should be discussed in more depth. In the business field in Nigeria, the word ‘freedom’ means the graduation of an apprentice. In the case of Godwin, young men must apprentice for more than the customary three years. Nevertheless, the apprentices remained with their employer and did not express a desire to leave or indicate that they had thought of their future graduation. Therefore, the question: ‘Which of your boys is up for freedom soon?’ was carefully asked in a non-suggestive manner, as some of the apprentices could hear the conversation. Even so, Godwin was firm and loud with his response as if to make sure everybody heard, using the chance to make himself clear on the issue: he prefers employing relatives with a mix of non-family members, but who are nonetheless referred to him by family members. Having them as employees, he is assured of the security of his goods — even citing the example of theft experienced by a neighbouring business and attributing it to the employment of non-family members.

The choice of the follow up question (‘Has the case been reported to the police?’) was deliberate. As regards the working of the police and legal system in Nigeria, the less privileged generally believe that they only serve the rich, and it is well known that police officers sometimes need incentives to pursue a case. However, the question was nonetheless included, because in a properly functioning economy where the rule of law is obeyed, reporting to police is the evident next line of action after a theft. The response demonstrates the difficult situation of local business owners for whom employment of family relations is seen as one of the ways to circumvent the inefficiency of law enforcement.

The predominant reason offered by respondents as to why they hire family members is a sense of responsibility. The unspoken rule is that when one becomes ‘successful’, one is bound by responsibility to take up a family member as an employee to allow them to gain a greater income or financial stability. Most business owners included in the research, in fact, began their economic life as apprentices working under family members, or as staff members within businesses owned by relatives, until enough capital was raised to enable them to start their independent activities. Similarly, individuals are often bound by responsibility to raise capital for a family member, a phenomenon which is discussed later in this section.

In a conversation with a small businesses owner named Igwe, he explained that he had an obligation to employ his nephew as mandated by a system of which he had been a beneficiary twelve years before, even though all of his income went to restocking his store and caring for his daughter (Igwe NR8).

Every respondent with a family member as an employee included ‘being bound to employ family members’ as one of the reasons for employment. It would be interesting to know how this process is monitored - who does the
reporting to the rest of the family? On what basis is the business considered to be successful? Who defines success: is it the elders, the owner of the business, or other relatives? What happens if the owner thinks the business is not successful, but his or her family members think otherwise? These are important questions that should be explored in subsequent research. The overriding observation is that business-owners preferred family members as employees, in the belief that they are ‘trustworthy’, ‘it fits the existing system of apprenticeship’, and the business-owners are ‘bound by responsibility’. We can thus conclude that family relations are integral in meeting the employment needs of small businesses.

Disputes settled at family meetings as opposed to court

Another reason that can explain the preference for family members as employees is the belief that it is easier to discipline a family member regarding their work ethic rather than a non-family employee. This is because if anything goes wrong it can be settled at a family meeting rather than in court or at the police station, which are generally avoided in Nigeria. It is quite common for business owners to correct a misbehaving family member by making threats to report the behaviour to the immediate family. A particular situation occurred where an employer and employee, two brothers, had a disagreement. According to the employer, the employee had been misbehaving, and, due to his carelessness, had broken some merchandise costing thousands of Naira. The employer decided to withhold his employee’s monthly allowance until the latter was able to raise the money to cover the cost, and also hit him in the face. Because of this decision, the employee took the law into his own hands, came late to work and sometimes kept money made from a sale. When asked about what he was going to do, the business owner commented: ‘he thinks I’m joking – when we get to the village I will call a family meeting, everybody will sit and judge the matter’ (Mazi NR 39). When asked why he had not sought legal redress for his withheld payments and physical abuse, the employee said, ‘We will soon go home for grandpa’s burial; when we get there, the matter will be tabled’ (Mazi NR 39).

This clearly shows a system where family meetings are used to resolve disputes. When asked separately why they had not reported the matter to the police — for the employee, a case of assault coupled with a withholding of his salary and for the employer, a case of possible theft — they seemed to not even consider it as an option, reflecting the beliefs of the previous respondent who refused to report a case of theft to the police.

ACCESS TO FINANCE
Stigmatisation of credit

Emerging from the discourse on how business is defined, was the observation of a stigmatisation of the credit system amongst some sections of the population — this was made evident from research about how businesses are defined and started (Monu NR 35).

In terms of this belief about credit, this is a similar excerpt from another respondent, although this interviewee was, at the time, looking to move into a bigger shop.

**Q:** Why do you not just get a business loan?

**A:** God forbid! As long as I keep praying someone will just walk up to me and give me part or all of the money. I do not believe in borrowing, I do not want the bank to start controlling what I do, I will not be able to sleep at night because all I will be thinking about is the loan. I have seen what these banks have done to people that have failed to pay up, which was not a fault of theirs. At least with my business like this, I can sleep with both my eyes closed and wake up without any fear in me. But I think they can do better; when a bank lends you money, first they should give you enough time to make it back; they should also have an officer attached to you as your
The respondent starts his response with the expression, “God forbid”, reflecting a deep wish that something should not happen. Even though he expressed a pressing necessity to actually move to a new shop, he continues by saying he also does not believe in borrowing, laying any need to raise credit on religious discourse, another important aspect, which is not discussed in this paper. He comments on the controlling effect of the bank after taking a loan and the continuous stress and worry attached to meeting up with the loan agreement as a deterrent for him in accessing formal credit. The respondent also introduces a suggestion regarding how banks should go about the lending process, stating that offering a longer time for loan repayment, as well as assigning advisors to the borrowers for guidance, could lead to lower loan default rates.

It should be noted that the stigmatised credit is the kind offered by commercial institutions, such as retail and micro-finance banks, while a loan from ROSCA (Rotating Savings and Credit Association) is seen as more acceptable. Therefore, although the cultural influence seems to be a stigmatisation of credit at first glance, what is clear is that not all credit is stigmatised. When interrogated about the reasons that loans from ROSCA are more acceptable than those from commercial banks, respondents were quick to explain the humaneness of ROSCA’s activities.

One of the interviewees believes the banks should have different terms: he thinks that the banks, after granting the loan, should follow up on the progress of one’s business at agreed intervals and should be ready to restructure the terms of the loan relative to prevailing economic conditions. If these conditions were followed, it would constitute a win-win situation for both the bank and the borrower. These suggestions were communicated to the two bank officials included in the interview process, and one remarked that they had embarked on a similar initiative whereby they offer assistance beyond the loan terms. This includes entrepreneurial development classes, which involve training the borrowers to save, to be aware of market trends, to have a grasp of financial literacy and to be able to gauge risk, among others. To increase local confidence in the system, some of the teachers were local business owners who had started at the same level as their clients and scaled up. When asked if this was done as a form of social responsibility on the part of the bank, the official clearly replied that it was a commercial decision that came up as a result of their past experiences. Other initiatives also embarked on by the banks include: constructing business hubs, organising bazaars or marketplaces where buyers and sellers could meet — with the sellers mostly being the bank customers themselves.

**Capital of Success**

If access to formal credit is limited, how then do businesses raise capital in this economic space? Three common ways were observed: the first was capital coming from a successful or older family member. Just as in the apprentice system in which business owners are bound by responsibility to employ relatives, successful or older entrepreneurs are bound by necessity to help family members start their businesses. They usually begin by taking in the relative as an employee and, after a few years, they provide him or her with some money to start an independent business. For example:

> I came to Lagos 24 years ago from the village to live with my uncle. My uncle at the time was a manager at a multinational company and also owned a paint shop. I was nineteen, I was becoming a nuisance in the village and I was of age to start making money. After a few discussions between papa and uncle, I was sent to Lagos to make a living, but I had to first work in uncle's shop. After a year in Lagos, I convinced uncle that Alade market was a good place to sell provisions and he gave me money to start. (Medi NR9)

It is quite a common occurrence that a successful individual invites or is sent a family member, in the expectation that he may help the person achieve financial independence. If this individual owns his or her business, the family member would be employed therein; otherwise, he or she would simply find an apprenticeship for the family
member, setting aside a sum of money that would be used by the individual to start up his or her business once ‘freedom’ was attained.

Another widespread form of raising capital in this setting is assistance from successful individuals. However, in this case, there is no blood relation between the successful individual and the new business owner — the only link that exists is living in the same community or location. A long-standing successful business owner is thus bound by responsibility to help any member of the market or particular community he belongs to, chosen at his discretion, to finance his/her business. This is illustrated by the following conversation:

**Q:** Why do they keep coming to you, did you advertise or something?

**A:** No, now, all of us that have been here for a while, maybe from 20 years and above — although it could be lesser, there is no fixed time frame — we are bound to help the next generation coming up. As it stands, it is only 3 of us that have been here for over 18 years, so these boys naturally come to us, but as you can see I am the most friendly that is why you have seen more at my shop. Like Chike, Silvanus and Loretta — I was the one that helped them start up. I think Chike came to meet me, but for Silvanus and Loretta, I observed them for a while, then I told their boss about my intentions, which they supported, and had good things to say about them. So when it was time for ‘freedom’, I told them I was going to give them money to start their own business.

**Q:** How did this start?

**A:** I know why I do this, or should I say why we do this, but how did it start or who started it? I do not know. It just looks like what one is meant to do. Is there a written rule? No. Is there an unwritten rule? I think so. What will happen if I do not do it? Nothing whatsoever. You see these things are peculiar, will I recommend it? Yes. Will I force it? Definitely not.

(Ageni NR29)

In answering the first questions, he explains how business owners are bound by necessity to help others set up their own business, although this is not stated by a written rule. This is thus another one of the unwritten rules governing economic life in this urban space. Helping others start a business is also considered to be something to take pride in. The respondent was quick to name people he had helped in recent times, who had in a short period grown very big. When he was scolding his employees at his shop, he often cited the fact that he had helped other successful entrepreneurs and that they should behave better so that they might have a similar path in life. In answering the second question, the respondent points to the cultural importance of an idea he strongly subscribes to.

Successful individuals with capital to invest in a new business are usually the ones who engage in this kind of practice. However, new entrepreneurs often approach individuals they deem financially able to offer them this kind of support. There are no definite criteria for selecting whom to support and this choice is in the hands of the more experienced business owner.

For these two sources of raising capital, an interesting question that arises is what defines a successful person. According to some entrepreneurs, such as Igwe and Richardson, there is an agreement that while they are still struggling and trying to fully establish their economic pursuits, in the eyes of their family members they are already considered successful — leading them to send a relative to them to help with their financial independence. While Igwe did not resist the suggestion, Richardson initially attempted to do so, but was unable to oppose his family in the end. As pointed out by Igwe:

*How do you want me to explain to them that I have been in Lagos for 12 years and I’m not able to support my younger one start a business? I’m a failure then. Don’t forget: to whom much is given, much is expected. They sent me 12 years ago, they are expecting a lot from me. So let*
her come first, at least she can start working with me, and when I raise enough money, I will help her start her own business. (NR8)

On the other hand, Richardson says he resisted the idea:

I told them I’m not ready, that I’m currently embarking on a project, but they wouldn’t listen. It almost turned to insult. So I accepted like that. I definitely cannot open beauty salons for her now, but the plan is I’ll give her money to be selling cosmetics, from that she can now graduate to owning a salon when we have raised enough money. (Richardson NR24)

The plan Richardson describes for his cousin, of initially trading before going into the desired field, is the third largest source of capital for most businesses. Much more should be discussed regarding this aspect in future work: what emerges from this study is rather an unwritten governing rule of economic life, whereby “successful” business owners are obliged to either provide start-up capital or direct employment to their family members.

CONCLUSION

This study set out to understand how business proceeds ‘on the street’ in Nigeria. It tried to investigate the rules that govern economic life while exploring the complexity of business development in a specifically urban context. In particular, this research looked at the ways in which capital is raised in this context. Through interviews and participatory observations, this study emphasised the level of social and cultural embeddedness that governs economic life, both in terms of access to capital and daily business operations.

Although businesses are meant to be sources of financial stability and function as an economic unit, the realities of staff employment and access to capital ‘on the street’ indicate that businesses are not just sources of income. They are also a part of social life – constituting achievements, obligations, stability, ties to morality, personal relationships, disagreements, reciprocity and so on. It can therefore be concluded that personal relationships and networks are very important mechanisms in the rules that govern economic life.

This study has aimed to extend our knowledge of how entrepreneurship is constructed, perceived and practised in society, by mapping the reality experienced. By looking at the context of Nigeria, the study’s goal is to add to current academic and practitioner debates regarding entrepreneurship and development more generally.

Over the past decades, diverse economic models have led to achievements in the economic growth and development of other countries. Microfinance is but one of the policies that has been advocated as key to poverty reduction and growth, and is considered a key mechanism for harnessing the economic potential of small entrepreneurs. However, if such models are translated into policies by the Nigerian government without fully taking into consideration the specific rules that govern economic life in this context, their intended results are unlikely to be reached. By looking at the detailed workings of small businesses in a specific urban context, it has pointed out how economic relationships really work in practice in Nigeria — workings which must be taken into account in future policies if objectives of poverty reduction and economic growth are to be effectively reached.

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Institutional specialisation in the battle against corruption: Uganda’s Anti-Corruption Court

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Abstract
Over the past few decades, the battle against corruption has emerged as a leading priority on the global development agenda. Countries around the world have designed and implemented a vast array of initiatives to prevent corruption as well as to hold accountable those who engage in corrupt activities. One long-standing but growing trend in the fight against corruption has been the movement toward institutional specialisation. Specifically, governments have established targeted anti-corruption units within existing public institutions or created new centralized agencies or authorities dedicated entirely to anti-corruption efforts. However, while specialisation has become a common strategy to strengthen the ability of governments to monitor, detect, investigate and even prosecute corruption in many countries, the adjudication and punishment of corrupt actors has conventionally remained within the exclusive ambit of traditional judicial and penal systems. This disinclination of countries to establish anti-corruption courts appears particularly puzzling given the particular value that specialisation may provide in the context of the judicial system and its role in the fight against corruption. This article examines the experience of one country that has recently experimented with such an innovative judicial institution, focusing on the Anti-Corruption Division (ACD) of Uganda’s High Court. It analyzes the challenges the ACD has faced and assesses its record on punishing corrupt actors, concluding that resource constraints and political interference, particularly on the part of the executive branch, have undermined the capacity of the Division to have a meaningful impact on the struggle to end impunity and corruption in Uganda.
INTRODUCTION

No longer dismissed as mere ‘grease for the wheels’ of inefficient bureaucracies (Huntington, 1968; Leff, 1964; Nye, 1967), in recent decades corruption and the fight against it have emerged as leading priorities on the global agenda, especially within the international development community. Corruption — conventionally defined as the misuse of public power for private benefit (Gray and Kaufmann, 1998; Lambsdorff, 2007; Rose-Ackerman, 1999) — is strongly associated with a panoply of deleterious economic, political and social outcomes including depressed economic growth (Aidt, 2011; Mo, 2001; Swaldeen, 2011), distortions in public resource allocation (Gupta, de Mello and Sharan, 2001; Mauro, 1998; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993), increased social and income inequality (Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme, 2002; Li, Xu and Zou, 2000) and weakened public trust in government and its representatives (Anderson and Tverdora, 2003; Power and Cyr, 2009; Seligson, 2002). Within and across countries, various initiatives have been developed and implemented with the aim of deterring corruption ex ante or holding those who participate in corrupt activities accountable ex post. A growing trend in such battles against corruption has been the movement towards institutional specialisation. This has been done either through the creation of targeted anti-corruption units within existing government entities such as police departments, offices of the public prosecutor or supreme audit authorities, or the establishment of new centralized agencies or authorities aimed exclusively at stopping corruption.

While specialisation has become a common strategy to strengthen government efforts to monitor, detect, investigate and even prosecute corruption in many countries, the adjudication and punishment of corrupt actors has conventionally remained within the exclusive ambit of countries’ traditional judicial and penal systems. However, several countries in Asia (India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines), Africa (Ghana, Kenya, Uganda) and Europe (Croatia, Slovakia) have begun to experiment using specialised courts and/or designated judges to hear corruption-related cases. This article examines one of these innovative judicial institutions — the Anti-Corruption Division (ACD) of Uganda’s High Court — analyzing the challenges the Court has faced, assessing its record on punishing corruption-related offences and identifying potential lessons for other developing countries considering the use of specialised judicial bodies or personnel to battle corruption.

I. SPECIALISATION IN PUBLIC ANTI-CORRUPTION INSTITUTIONS

As the problem of corruption and its associated ills rose to prominence on the international agenda in the 1990s, many global and regional organizations began to develop and adopt various ‘hard law’ (treaties, conventions) and ‘soft law’ (recommendations, guidelines, principles) instruments to prevent and combat corruption in its multiple forms. While the scope, membership, strength and monitoring mechanisms associated with these legal instruments vary enormously, a common emphasis has been placed on the need for countries to enact and strengthen anti-corruption legislation and to implement effective internal monitoring systems. Moreover, these instruments have highlighted the need to ensure that the public agencies charged with implementing and enforcing such laws and policies possess adequate knowledge, expertise, resources and independence. For example, the United Nations (UN) Convention against Corruption calls on signatories to

ensure the existence of a body or bodies or persons specialised in combating corruption through law enforcement. Such body or bodies or persons shall be granted the necessary independence, in accordance with the fundamental principles of the legal system of the State Party, to be able to carry out their functions effectively and without any undue influence. Such persons or staff of such body or bodies should have the appropriate training and resources to carry out their tasks.


Similarly, under Section 5 of Article 20 of the African Union (AU) Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, states party to the agreement are required to ‘undertake to adopt necessary measures to ensure that national authorities or agencies are specialised in combating corruption and related offences by, among others, ensuring that the staff are trained and motivated to effectively carry out their duties.’ (African Union, 2003).
The drive towards specialisation reflects various realities about the nature of corruption as well as opinions on how best to address it. First, as a clandestine, sometimes-complex activity typically conducted under the veil of secrecy, corruption may be difficult for conventional law enforcement agencies to detect, investigate and prosecute and may thus be handled more capably by entities and individuals with specialised training, expertise and technologies (Recanatini, 2011). Second, as corruption is both a symptom and cause of dysfunctions in governance institutions, existing bureaucratic entities may lack the resources, capacity or political will to deter, detect, investigate or punish corrupt behaviours. Third, in many countries the government entities and officials traditionally responsible for the promulgation, enforcement and interpretation of laws—members of the legislature, police force, public prosecutor’s office and judiciary—may themselves be corrupted, thus undermining the entire accountability system as well as the rule of law more broadly (e.g. Transparency International, 2007). Fourth, in regimes in which the balance of power is tilted in favour of a single branch of government (such as the executive), efforts to prevent and combat corruption may only be carried out effectively if they are entrusted to entities outside the existing power and bureaucratic structures. Finally, the financing and administration of anti-corruption initiatives may require levels of independence, accountability and transparency that might not be appropriate or logistically feasible for traditional public agencies.

A) Specialisation in the Judiciary: Rationales for Anti-Corruption Courts

Expanding on these arguments, there are reasons to believe that specialisation may provide particular value in the context of the judicial system and its role in the fight against corruption. The courts in many countries are plagued by significant backlogs leading to lengthy delays in bringing cases to trial and creating opportunities for evidence to be lost or witnesses’ memories to fade. Specialised courts may be able both to alleviate the burden on existing courts and to adjudicate corruption-related cases more expeditiously, offering particular advantages in cases involving sensitive matters or prominent individuals (Hatchard, 2014). In addition, given that corruption cases often involve politically or financially powerful individuals, the courts involved may benefit from strong guarantees of transparency and independence that may not be practically or politically feasible to extend to the judicial system as a whole. For example, in order to enhance the availability and reliability of the court records of corruption cases, the Jakarta Anti-Corruption Court in Indonesia uses audiovisual equipment to record all of its proceedings (Schütte and Butt, 2013), a practice that may be unnecessary or prohibitively expensive to apply to all cases in every court in the country.

Focusing on the role of judicial institutions in the entire accountability process, strong performance on the part of monitoring and investigative agencies may prove ultimately futile if judges and the courts fail to punish the individuals against whom they gather evidence and prosecute cases. Thus, weaknesses in the capacity of the courts to adjudicate corruption cases and sanction those parties found guilty may help to perpetuate the specter of impunity that surrounds corrupt actors in many countries. This can foster the popular perception that the law serves the interests of the powerful and the few rather than providing equal protection and opportunities for all (Morris, 2009, p. 9; Botero and Ponce, 2011). Moreover, deficiencies in the judicial system may create conditions and incentives that eventually undermine the performance of monitoring bodies such as supreme audit authorities and investigative entities including the police, public prosecutors and ombudsmen. Without effective punishment mechanisms, such authorities may see little practical value in uncovering, exposing and prosecuting corruption. If corrupt officials remain in positions of power and free from sanction they may be able to directly or indirectly thwart the efforts of such entities to detect and investigate corrupt activities (Power and Taylor, 2011, pp. 13-14; Prado and Carson, 2014).

Finally, in many countries the judiciary itself is rife with corruption. Transparency International’s 2013 Global Corruption Barometer survey of more than 114,000 individuals in 107 countries found that 56% of all respondents considered the judiciaries in their countries to be corrupt or extremely corrupt. The judiciary was ranked the most
corrupt of twelve government institutions in twenty of the surveyed countries, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Madagascar and Tanzania (Transparency International, 2013a). Globally, 24% of total respondents who came into contact with the judiciary in their country in the previous twelve months reported paying a bribe, with judicial bribery response rates in sub-Saharan African countries ranging from 9% in Sudan to 82% in Sierra Leone; 58% of Ugandans who interacted with the judiciary indicated that they had paid a bribe (Transparency International, 2013a). Beyond constituting corruption in its own right, corruption among members of the judiciary also presents serious challenges to efforts to combat corruption more broadly, as judges in corruption-related cases may themselves be improperly induced to issue rulings in favour of other dishonest officials, particularly if they are other judges. While the specific causes of corruption in the judiciary vary from country to country, many of the broad strategies recommended to mitigate factors that contribute to its incidence suggest that specialised courts may be one institutional response. Oft-noted remedies to the problem of judicial corruption typically include enhancing the financial, administrative and institutional autonomy of the judiciary, creating more transparent appointment, promotion, censure and removal criteria and processes, strengthening accountability mechanisms through the adoption of codes of conduct, simplification of court procedures and publication of judicial decisions (Pepys, 2007; Hatchard, 2014). While such massive reforms may require substantial resources and political will to enact for the judiciary as a whole, the establishment of anti-corruption courts that possess some of these recommended characteristics and safeguards may help to limit corruption among judges and hold corrupt actors in wider society accountable.

B) Establishing and Operating Anti-Corruption Courts: Barriers and Decisions

Despite these various rationales, the emphasis in international standards and conventions on specialisation in the fields of corruption prevention and law enforcement has generally not been extended to the realm of the courts (OECD, 2013, p. 26). As such, in many countries, corruption may be detected by specialised monitoring or auditing bodies, investigated by specialised police units or officers and prosecuted by specialised government attorneys, but the cases are ultimately heard and adjudicated by general criminal or civil court judges. Corruption-related cases may be retained within the exclusive jurisdiction of the standard judiciary on the basis of constitutional/legal, political or practical barriers to the creation and operation of specialised courts. Legally, due process standards or other constitutional provisions may prevent or discourage governments from establishing alternative courts or forums outside the traditional judicial system. For instance, constitutional courts in Indonesia and Slovakia declared the anti-corruption courts in those countries unconstitutional, though authorities in both countries were eventually able to reform their specialised court systems to meet constitutional standards and continue operations (Martini, 2014; Schütte and Butt, 2013).

Even in countries whose legal frameworks permit establishment of such specialised courts, their creation may require the participation and thus agreement, or at least acquiescence, of members of the executive, legislative and/or judicial branches and the marshalling of the requisite political will among these various bodies around the issue of an anti-corruption court. This may be politically infeasible except in extreme circumstances such as following a change in government or in the wake of a massive corruption scandal. Finally, many countries lack adequate personnel, buildings, financial resources and technology to support their existing courts, rendering the establishment of additional courts impractical.

Those countries that do resolve to establish a specialised judicial mechanism to hear corruption cases subsequently face a host of legal and logical questions and decisions concerning the structure and operations of such courts or cadres of judges. In terms of their relationship to the broader judicial system, anti-corruption courts may be created as independent entities equivalent to other courts in the country (e.g., Slovakia’s Specialised Court).
Criminal Court, Indonesia’s Sandiganbayan, Pakistan’s Accountability Courts) or as divisions in the existing court structure (e.g., Ghana’s Financial and Economic Crimes Court within the High Court, Uganda’s Anti-Corruption Division in the High Court). In either case, it must be determined whether such courts function as trial and/or appellate fora as well as what the delineated channels of and standards for any appeal should be. Anti-corruption courts may be constituted under federal or sub-national laws and operate at the national, state or local levels. In addition to defining the structural and functional relationships between anti-corruption courts and the conventional judiciary, governments must also establish the rules governing the interactions between those specialised courts and other anti-corruption actors and entities such as offices of the public prosecutor, police forces and auditing agencies. Specialised courts may be established as permanent entities or ad hoc initiatives similar to the international tribunals created to investigate human rights abuses in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. For example, while the anti-corruption courts in most countries (e.g., Indonesia, the Philippines, Pakistan, Uganda) are permanent fora, in Thailand, the Supreme Court’s Criminal Division for Holders of Public Offices is constituted only after a criminal case involving illegal activity – including corruption – has been initiated against a high-level official (Organic Law on Criminal Proceedings against Persons Holding Political Positions 1999, Sec. 13).

On the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, the scope of offences triable in such fora may be limited to charges directly involving corruption or may also include associated or related offences. Given their putative objectives, anti-corruption courts are presumably authorized to adjudicate criminal cases involving corruption, but governments may also opt to allow such courts (or divisions therein) to hear civil corruption cases such as those involving disgorgement or asset recovery. Regarding personal jurisdiction, anti-corruption courts may be empowered to hear cases against all public officials involved in corrupt activities, only those at or above a specified level, or charges brought against both government employees and private citizens engaged in public corruption schemes. For example, the anti-corruption court in the Philippines, the Sandiganbayan, is authorized to serve as a court of first instance for corruption cases involving high-ranking public officials at or above a specified salary grade (e.g., mayors, military colonels and captains, members of Congress and the judiciary) and an appellate court for corruption cases originally heard in the country’s regional trial courts that involved lower-ranking officials and public employees (Benitez, 2013). Under India’s Prevention of Corruption Act (or simply, Corruption Act), designated ‘Special Judges’ can hear cases brought against not only public sector officials and employees but also any persons ‘remunerated by the Government by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty’ such as representatives of non-governmental organizations that receive public funds (Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Sec. 2(c)(i), 4; Jain, 2009, p. 90).

Anti-corruption courts may exercise exclusive jurisdiction over corruption-related offences or hold concurrent jurisdiction along with conventional courts, such that corruption cases might be heard in either a specialised or a standard court. Relatedly, the jurisdiction of the specialised courts over corruption cases may be mandatory or optional. For instance, in India, only designated Special Judges can conduct trials of offences falling under the country’s Corruption Act (Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Sec. 4). If jurisdiction is concurrent or optional, the government must determine the procedures for moving such cases into the anti-corruption court system, including the criteria for and means of petition, as well as specify which party(ies) or other actors have standing to move corruption cases to the specialised courts. Removal may be based on motion by the prosecution or defence (or require the approval of both sides), recommendation from another anti-corruption authority (e.g., inspector general, anti-corruption bureau), or taken up by the court sua sponte; for example, in Thailand, the Supreme Court’s Criminal Division for Holders of Public Offices only hears criminal corruption cases involving political position holders that are submitted by the Office of the Attorney General or the National Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC) (Organic Act on Counter Corruption 1999, Sec. 70, 71).

With respect to judicial personnel, anti-corruption courts may be presided over by regular but specially-designated judges; judges or magistrates meeting specified criteria such as length of tenure (e.g. India’s Special Judges, Kenya’s Special Magistrates) or retired, foreign or other judges selected from outside the conventional judiciary (e.g., Lesotho’s appointment of an Irish-born judge, Justice Brendan Cullinan, a retired chief justice of the Lesotho High Court, to hear the international corruption cases involving the Lesotho Highlands Water Authority scandal in...
1999-2004). The procedures for selecting/appointing and promoting – as well as disciplining and removing – such judges need to be defined and their periods of tenure determined. Finally, because specialised courts are generally intended to expedite proceedings, the rules governing the operation of such fora may include requirements concerning the timeliness with which such cases must be heard, the frequency with which proceedings must occur or time limits on the duration of judicial deliberations. For example, statutes require that India’s Special Judges and Kenya’s Special Magistrates ‘as far as practicable, hold the trial of an offence on a day-to-day basis’ (Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Sec. 4(4); Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003 (2009), Sec. 4(4)).

II. UGANDA’S STRUGGLE AGAINST CORRUPTION

A) Corruption in Uganda

While measuring corruption is a notably challenging and imperfect endeavor (e.g., Golden and Picci, 2005; Knack, 2007), all available indicators strongly suggest that corruption is endemic in Uganda. Out of 175 countries surveyed in Transparency International (TI)’s 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index, Uganda tied for 142nd place with the Comoros and Ukraine (Transparency International, 2014). According to TI’s 2013 Global Corruption Barometer (GCB), 87% of Ugandans believe that corruption is a ‘serious’ or ‘very serious’ problem in the country (Transparency International, 2013a); the country’s National Governance Baseline Survey in 2013 similarly found that 82% of surveyed Ugandans reported that the extent of corruption was ‘very much’ (Inspectorate General, 2014, p. 6). According to respondents polled by the World Economic Forum in creating its 2014-2015 Global Competitiveness Report, corruption is the most problematic factor for doing business in Uganda (World Economic Forum 2014, p. 370). Troublingly, when polled about the perceived trajectory of corruption in the country over the previous two years, three-quarters of Ugandans indicated that corruption had increased, compared to a global average of 53% (Transparency International, 2013a). The World Bank’s Governance Indicators further support the perception that corruption is high and worsening in Uganda: since 1996, the country has dropped from the 28.8 percentile on the Bank’s Control of Corruption indicator to the 13.8 percentile (World Bank, 2014).

Survey and anecdotal evidence further indicates that corruption remains a serious problem in Uganda at all levels of government, from petty corruption and bribery among low-level officials and bureaucrats to grand-scale embezzlement of public resources by the country’s leaders. With regard to petty corruption, according to TI’s 2013 East Africa Bribery Index, the overall likelihood for a Ugandan to encounter bribery while seeking state services is nearly 19% (Transparency International Kenya, 2014, p. 1). On the 2013 GCB, 64% of the country’s citizens reported that they had been asked to pay a bribe by a public official at least once (Transparency International, 2013a). Table 1 reports the findings of the GCB survey on Ugandans’ perceptions concerning the levels of corruption within and across institutions in the country:
Table 1: Perceptions of Corruption, by Institution, in Uganda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>% that think ‘corrupt’ or ‘extremely corrupt’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judiciary</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public officials/civil servants</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical and health</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament/legislature</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business/private sector</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious bodies</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Recent scandals and media reports further reveal that corruption stretches to the highest levels of government in Uganda. A 2012 report by the Auditor General of Uganda revealed significant financial mismanagement of donor funds by the Office of the Prime Minister. Eventually it was revealed that €12 million in aid from Ireland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark had ended up in accounts of officials in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) instead of a peace recovery and development program for Northern Uganda, a region long-ravaged by conflict. In response, the European Union and several European nations suspended aid to the country in late 2012, but resumed aid in 2013 after the Ugandan government repaid most of the missing funds and met other donor criteria including reforms to the country’s financial management systems and corruption programs (Human Rights Watch, 2013, pp. 48-49). In June 2013, the OPM’s principle accountant was convicted and sentenced to five years for fraud for his role in the affair. He and three former employees of the Finance Ministry are currently facing additional charges including abuse of office, embezzlement and diversion of funds (Kiyonga, 2014). Beyond allegations of high-level graft, reports indicate that the system of patronage politics that has helped to maintain President Yoweri Museveni’s twenty-eight-year hold on power remains strong, with evidence that financial enrichment has been used to build and maintain loyalty among politicians (including members of Parliament) and partisan groups. This includes an infamous episode in April 2013 in which the president publicly handed over a sack containing 250,000,000 Ugandan shillings (US$100,000) to a youth group from Eastern Uganda with no apparent restrictions on or instructions for its use (Human Rights Watch, 2013).

Despite the Museveni Administration’s repeated and vehement pledges to take a zero-tolerance stance against corruption (e.g., Museveni, 2013; Poverty Alleviation Department-State House, 2011, pp. 33-34), in practice the president’s rhetoric has been overshadowed by his public support for members of his inner circle when they have faced accusations of corruption. For example, in 2008 Museveni publicly voiced his support for Amama Mbabazi, his then-Security Minister and the current Secretary General for Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM) Party, when Mbabazi was implicated in corruption allegations involving the sale of land to the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) (Obore, 2008; Uganda Debt Network, 2013, p. 17). While a Parliamentary committee investigating the matter issued a report recommending that Mbabazi and his colleague face censure, the majority of members of Parliament (MPs) ultimately voted to exonerate the men in November 2008. Three months later, Museveni reshuffled his cabinet, appointing four MPs who had been instrumental in mobilizing fellow members to oppose the censure motion against Mbabazi to prime ministerial posts (Wanambwa, 2009).

In another matter, while an abuse-of-office case against former Vice President Gilbert Bukenya was pending in 2011, Museveni was quoted in the media as stating that the Attorney General had informed him that the case had ‘no merit’ (Mulondo et al., 2011). The case thus publicly undermined, the Inspectorate General later withdrew the charges, citing lack of evidence (Uganda Debt Network, 2013, p. 18). More recently, when Mike Mukula, a former
state minister for health and a current MP, appealed his conviction and sentence for embezzling 210 million Ugandan shillings (US$80,000) from the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation in 2013, Museveni publicly paid Mukula’s legal team 100 million Ugandan shillings to aid in his defence (Lumu, 2013); Mukula’s appeal was later successful. As a prosecutor in the Office of the Inspectorate of Government said to Human Rights Watch in a recent interview, ‘If the head of state comes out openly to offer to pay for someone’s lawyers, what kind of message does that send to us? We know we cannot win.’ (Human Rights Watch, 2013, p. 17).

B) Uganda’s Public Anti-Corruption Institutions

Despite the challenges facing Uganda with regard to corruption, its anti-corruption laws are notably comprehensive, receiving a perfect score from a leading international non-governmental organization focused on governance and anti-corruption (Global Integrity, 2011). Through statutes including the Penal Code Act (1950), the Leadership Code Act (2002) (LCA), the Anti-Corruption Act (2009) and the Anti-Money Laundering Act (2013), the country has criminalized core corruption offences including embezzlement, extortion, active and passive bribery, foreign bribery, using public resources for private gain, using confidential state information for private gain, money-laundering, attempted corruption and organized crime. Additionally, in 2010, Uganda enacted the Whistleblowers Protection Act to shield whistleblowers and provide monetary rewards in return for reporting. The LCA and the Code of Conduct and Ethics (2005) establish minimum standards of behaviour and conduct for political leaders and public officials, respectively. The country is also a signatory to both the UN and AU conventions against corruption. However, despite the robustness of the country’s statutes and regulations on paper, the actual enforcement of those laws has been lacking; while Global Integrity gave Uganda’s overall legal framework a 98 (‘very strong’) on its 2011 ‘scorecard,’ the country’s ‘actual implementation score’ of 51 was considered ‘very weak’ (Global Integrity, 2011).

Implementation of the country’s anti-corruption initiatives and enforcement of its laws have been entrusted to several public agencies with varying degrees of autonomy and scopes of authority, but the performance and effectiveness of these institutions have been largely constrained by political interference and resource limitations.

- **Office of the Inspectorate of Government (IG):** The IG is the primary anti-corruption agency in Uganda. Its powers, specified in the 1995 Constitution and the Inspectorate of Government Act (2002), include the ability to ‘investigate, cause investigation, arrest, cause arrest, prosecute or cause prosecution with respect to cases involving corruption or abuse of authority or public office’ (Constitution 1995, Art. 230). Headed by the Inspector General of the Government (IGG), IG is an independent agency that operates similarly to an ombudsman but with enhanced powers. For example, the LCA requires a range of national and local political leaders to submit to the IG a written declaration of their incomes, assets and liabilities, as well as those of their spouses, children and other dependents (The Leadership Code Act 2002, Art. 4(2)); the IG is then tasked with inspecting the disclosure and may request clarification if discrepancies are discovered. However, in March 2010, Uganda’s Constitutional Court ruled that the IG does not have the authority to enforce the LCA, meaning that the IG cannot implement any decisions or impose sanctions against leaders found to have violated the Code (Inspector General, 2014, p. 33). Empowered to investigate, arrest and prosecute cases involving corruption on the part of public officials (the Directorate of Public Prosecutions (DPP), discussed below, can prosecute both public officials and private citizens), the IG may initiate inquiries into suspected corrupt behaviours in response to public complaints or on its own initiative. Over the past five years, the number of new complaints received and handled by the IG has nearly doubled from 1,566 in 2009 to 2,876 in 2013 (Inspectorate General, 2014, p. 6). According to the IG’s reports to Parliament, IG prosecutions have steadily increased since 2006 (44 cases), reaching a high of 168 cases in 2012 before declining modestly to 145 in 2013 (Inspectorate General, 2014, p. 44), a drop the IG attributed to the closure of the Anti-Corruption Division for part of that year (discussed below). While the IG’s success in investigating and prosecuting corruption among public officials has been...
notable, ‘its autonomy, efficiency and effectiveness have been hampered by the lack of resources and staff, as well as influence by the Executive’ (Martini, 2013, pp. 7-8).

- **Office of the Auditor General (OAG):** The OAG is responsible for overseeing the government’s operations through financial and other management audits of the central and local governments as well as public institutions. While Uganda’s OAG is generally considered a strong institution that has successfully enhanced budget transparency in the country (International Budget Partnership, 2012), the president’s authority to appoint the Auditor General compromises the Office’s independence, as illustrated by reports that the president has directed the OAG to investigate certain government departments (Global Integrity, 2011).

- **Directorate of Public Prosecutions (DPP):** The DPP is the executive branch office charged with handling and prosecuting all criminal cases in the country, including offences related to corruption, or to delegate such powers where necessary (Constitution 1995, Art. 120). The powers and authorities of the DPP differ from those held by the IG in at least two crucial ways. First, unlike the IG, the DPP can prosecute private citizens, with the result that their prosecutors receive a large number of cases involving private corruption; in 2013, the majority of corruption-related cases handled by the DPP involved obtaining money by false pretence (Inspectorate General, 2014, p. 44). Second, while the IG has its own investigative capabilities, the DPP relies on the police to conduct its investigations, and the data on the DPP’s resolution of corruption-related cases suggests that the ‘inadequate investigative capacity of DPP officials’ contributes to the office’s relatively high rate of acquittals, withdrawals, dismissals and closures (Inspectorate General, 2014, p. 46).

- **Directorate for Ethics and Integrity (DEI):** Located in the Office of the Presidency, the DEI is responsible for coordinating the government’s efforts against corruption and implementing the country’s National Anti-Corruption Strategies (NACS). The DEI also chairs the Inter Agency Forum (IAF) which aims to ensure effective coordination among the various anti-corruption institutions in Uganda, but reports indicate that ‘a lack of funding and capacity has constrained its effectiveness’ (Martini 2013, p. 8).

### III. Background, Structure and Assessment of Uganda’s Anti-Corruption Court

In addition to these various laws and specialised agencies tasked with preventing, monitoring, investigating and prosecuting corruption, in 2005, the Ugandan Parliament passed a provision creating an anti-corruption court and, in July 2008, the country’s judiciary administratively established the ACD as a specialised division in the High Court to adjudicate corruption and corruption-related offences. The ACD is one of eight specialised divisions in the High Court, which include units focused on civil, commercial, criminal, family, land, international criminal matters and the execution of court orders and decisions. The ACD has unlimited original jurisdiction and exclusive appellate jurisdiction over offences under the Anti-Corruption Act and can also hear cases under the Penal Code Act, Leadership Code Act or any other statute related to corruption; if a defendant before the ACD has been charged ‘with any other offence related to’ the corruption-related offence, the ACD can also hear the related charge (Human Rights Watch, 2013). The court is based in Kampala, which some commentators argue ‘inevitably causes some delays and loss of files due to the process of transferring from other cities’ into the capital city (Hatchard, 2014, p. 230). The ACD can also hold sessions in any of the twelve High Court circuits located throughout the country (Human Rights Watch, 2013).

Pursuant to clause 4 of the Legal Notice 9 of 2009, which created the ACD, the objective of the Court is ‘to expeditiously dispose of corruption and corruption-related offences in an orderly and cost-effective manner’ (Mugamba, 2013, p. 1). By that metric, the ACD’s performance appears to be satisfactory, with the latest annual report from the IG indicating that while the prosecutions of corruption cases remain often-lengthy processes, the Anti-Corruption Division has been able to resolve such cases more swiftly than other courts (Inspectorate General, 2014, p. 45). The conviction rate for defendants before the ACD has also been strong; analyzing 88 first-instance
cases, Human Rights Watch and Yale Law School’s Lowenstein Clinic found that the Court had a 68% conviction rate (Human Rights Watch, 2013, p. 36). However, while some senior government officials and politicians, including several former Senior Ministers, have been prosecuted in the ACD, only one, former State Minister for Health Mike Mukula, has been convicted—and his conviction was overturned on appeal. Thus the vast majority of cases and convictions involve low-level, local government officials as well as modest sums; as one private criminal defence attorney remarked, ‘the petty corruption is prosecuted beautifully in Uganda,’ drawing a stark contrast between cases dealing with the activities of government bureaucrats and those involving the country’s ‘big fish’ (Human Rights Watch, 2013, p. 37).

The ACD’s efforts to deter and punish corruption have been stymied by many of the same challenges as Uganda’s other anti-corruption institutions, especially with regard to resource and capacity limitations and political interference. The court has been understaffed since its inception and a 2012 report by the head of the ACD highlighted its ‘puny budget,’ noting that funding had been cut by 40% that year and that even the allocated funds had not been released to the ACD in a timely manner (Mugamba, 2013). The Uganda Debt Network, a leading NGO in the country, has further emphasized that the court’s lack of adequate technical, financial and human capacity undermines its ability ‘to perform its functions to the full’ (Uganda Debt Network, 2013, p. 22). The court has also been vulnerable to attack from and interference by political leaders including members of the judiciary. In July 2013, in response to a petition from a Kampala attorney, Uganda’s Constitutional Court suspended the proceedings of the ACD to determine whether the inclusion of magistrates in the ACD’s structural framework was constitutional (Tusingwire v Attorney General, 2013). While the judges, by a vote of 4-1, eventually confirmed the constitutionality of the ACD and its structure in December 2013, the nascent court was forced to abandon operations for five months as its judges were redeployed to other courts and cases. The IG noted the negative impact of this closure on its ability to prosecute corruption cases and secure convictions (Inspectorate General, 2013, pp. 44-45).

While the ACD is still a relatively young institution, its experiences to date suggest that while specialisation may provide certain benefits to courts and other anti-corruption agencies in the form of more efficient proceedings, it is not a panacea for improving the punishment of corruption offences. Moreover, anti-corruption courts that do not enjoy sufficient degrees of institutional, administrative and financial authority may find themselves caught by the same bureaucratic and political hurdles as other entities focused on preventing or combating corruption.

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Towards a new community-led governance approach, integrating the global into the mundane — and why design matters

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Abstract
Contemporary Africa is undergoing a rapid evolution, with several African nations experiencing the highest global rates of urbanization. Nigeria, ‘The Giant of Africa’, is no exception and has recently surpassed South Africa as the continent’s largest economy. Along with historical challenges the country has faced, such as corruption and lack of governmental transparency, rapid urbanization brings a new set of issues to the fore. This paper explores alternative governance models in developing nations against the backdrop of rapid urbanization and the growth of informal structures. Roughly two-third of Africa’s urban population live in informal, over-crowded settlements, and two-fifths live below the poverty line. Informal employment accounts for roughly 60 percent of urban jobs. This paper examines potential models and solutions to address some of these urgent issues, stressing the importance of integrating the ‘global’ with the ‘mundane’. The paper focuses on the low-income community of Makoko in Lagos, Nigeria, as a case study. It presents alternative community-led sustainable approaches to urban governance, while drawing attention to the interface between the built environment and governance, and highlighting the role of design in shaping social infrastructure. It further suggests that formal/informal and top-down/bottom-up governance should come together to tackle urban challenges such as the lack of basic infrastructure and services, the lack of steady income and the adaption to climate change.
We are failing in how we plan, build and manage our cities.

Joan Clos, UN Habitat

BACKGROUND: URBANIZATION IN AFRICA

Africa is the world’s fastest urbanizing continent, with a growing number of centres and institutes dedicated to studies and research of African cities. Sub-Saharan Africa is undergoing intense demographic growth and 37% of the population live in urban areas (Morakinyo et al., 2012: 1). That percentage is expected to rise dramatically in the coming decades, predominantly due to informal growth. By 2050, the urban population in Africa is expected to triple, with this population rise concentrated in two countries: Congo and Nigeria (Tibaijuka, 2007; Burdett et al., 2014).

When reading, thinking, and writing about Africa’s ‘urban revolution’ (Parnell and Pieterse, 2014) or Africa’s ongoing or expected urbanization process, five critical conditions can be observed. First, despite the sheer size, diversity, and history of the African continent, many scholars still speak of ‘African cities’ in a uniform sense, while simultaneously acknowledging that it is an improper generalization (Myers, 2011; Parnell and Pieterse, 2014). There is an ever-increasing flow of knowledge but relatively little familiarity with local peculiarities (Obrist et al., 2013). This may be one reason why highly important and politically charged institutions such as UN Habitat and the World Bank tend to draw ‘one-size-fits-all’ policies (Myers 2011), and why urban regions in general (but particularly in the developing world) suffer from an ‘implementation gap’—the result of a disconnect between policies, planning, implementation and feedback processes. Policy-makers and international diplomats are too often far removed from what is ‘happening on the ground’; and stakeholders, including the local population, are not identified and involved effectively enough (UN-Habitat, 2013; Satterthwaite, 2013; Berrisford, 2014; Hoelzel, 2014; Van Wezemal, 2014).

Second, there is a conceptual lack of clarity when discussing cities versus urbanized areas, or urbanization as a whole. Many publications and conferences in the fields of urban studies, urban research, urban planning, and urban design in recent years began with the observation that ‘by 2050 75% of the world’s population will live in cities’ (UN-Habitat, 1996; United Nations, 2008; Brenner and Schmid, 2014: 312; Burdett and Sujdic, 2011), a number that has recently been adjusted to be 66% by 2050 (United Nations, 2014). Today, with 54% of the world’s population living in urbanized areas (United Nations, 2014), it has become a ‘doxic common sense’ (Brenner and Schmid, 2014, p. 310) amongst scholars, professionals, politicians, and diplomats that we live in the ‘Urban Age’. This thesis has gained international prominence particularly through The Urban Age Project of the Cities Programme at the London School of Economics (LSE), (discussed in a series of international conferences in São Paulo, Mumbai and Johannesburg, amongst others), and publications such as ‘Living in the endless city’ (Burdett and Sujdic, 2011).

The term ‘city’ (and by extension, the term ‘urban age’) has captured the imagination to achieve a certain (possibly glorified) ideological status (Wachsmuth, 2014). ‘City’ and ‘urban’ have become fashionable, making it difficult for discourse to break out beyond the mainstream. There is yet another layer of difficulty in the idea of the ‘city’: it is still largely defined through Western, predominantly European, ideas. By this definition, the traditional ‘city’ possesses a clear centre, clear edges, and a classic urban civilization, finding its expression in not only the hope of its inhabitants but also in the assumption that cities and urban spaces around the world almost automatically offer a space to engage in democratic debate and practice (Pierre, 2011, p. 13; Rode and Shankar, 2014). This notion, for good or for bad, is challenged when working in an African urban context where the logic and systems of tribes and traditional ruling structures are still very present (Creutzfeldt, 2013). Furthermore, it has also become clear that the process of urbanization has fundamentally and globally changed over time (Diener et al., 2005; Schmid, 2014; Parnell and Pieterse, 2014). Former rural areas have undergone a process of urbanization where once smaller villages and towns have grown together to form ‘in-between cities’ (Sieverts, 1997), ‘desakota’ (McGee, 1990), or ‘exopolis’ (Soja, 2000). Most urban areas, whether in emerging, developing, or developed regions, are composed of multiple municipalities (Lorrain, 2011).
Third, cities are perceived as vital sources of economic development, with urbanization and prosperity in almost perfect correlation (Jacobs, 1969; Gaeser, 2011). Unlike most nation-states, the origin and growth of cities is usually not ethnic, cultural or geographic but primarily economic (Pierre, 2011). Dense and heterogeneous city regions are the driving forces of the global economy, generating enormous wealth, technological innovation and cultural creativity (Christiaanse, 2009; Barber, 2013; Soja and Kanai, 2014; Turok, 2014). When explaining the logic for the rapid urbanization observed over recent decades around the world, it has been assumed — by economists, planners, and policymakers, amongst others — that individuals decide to move from rural to urban areas primarily in the hope of getting a job and hence improving their income. However, this is only partially true for African urban regions and the urbanization process. The majority of Africa’s expanding urban population is born in cities, not in villages (Fox, 2011; Turok, 2014). Yet, many authors (especially in mainstream urban textbooks, international diplomacy, policy-making and journalism) overplay the narrative of cities as spaces for entrepreneurship and opportunity. While urban growth is undoubtedly an urgent challenge to deal with, it may nevertheless help to distinguish between the pressure created by the challenge and the recognition of opportunities arising from it — particularly when it comes to places that have a high, and growing, rate of informal settlements and jobs.

In Makoko, a low-income community in the heart of Lagos which this paper focuses on, 40% of the population live on less than USD 1.25 per day (Fabulous Urban and Heinrich Böll Foundation Nigeria, 2014). This is reflected by the figures on sub-Saharan Africa, where 43% of the urban population live below the poverty line (Turok, 2014, p. 62). Additionally, the discourse in many developing regions places too much emphasis on economic growth, resulting in a fixation on bare numbers and figures instead of economic development, which takes the distribution of wealth into account (Dugarova, 2014). The latter would benefit a wide spectrum of the population, while a single-minded focus on GDP growth and international investment may result in even larger income inequalities, benefiting an elite minority (Lagos State Government, 2012a). Even the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund agree in their latest report that job creation and poverty reduction require much more than just economic growth (World Bank et al., 2014/2015). There are an increasing number of extremely rich Africans; The Economist (2011) declared Aliko Dangote, a Nigerian businessman as the richest person of African descent. While such individual success stories are impressive, the vast majority, even in Lagos’ booming economy with a relatively low unemployment rate of 7.6% (National Bureau of Statistics, 2010, p. 12), live partially in extreme poverty (Akinsete et al., 2014; Fabulous Urban, 2014). The recognition of the importance of the informal sector and a focus on its recognition, rather than exclusion, through collaboration with the formal sector, could make great contributions to the even development of urban spaces in the 21st century (Neuirth, 2012; Brown et al., 2014; Winkelried, 2005).

Fourth, it is widely recognized that large cities can create or at least intensify inequalities, social segregation and social polarization (UN-Habitat, 2003; Davis, 2006; Koonings and Kruit, 2010; Soja 2010). This is highly visible in many African cities, where the differences between the state, public authorities, the elite and the urban poor majority are particularly stark (Myers, 2011). Rapid urbanization can further result in other challenges including congestion, growing informal settlements, informal economies, environmental pollution, and restricted access to public services (Floater et al., 2014, p. 7). However, most of these problems are the result of poorly managed urban growth (Burdett et al., 2014; Floater et al., 2014) which brings to the fore the downside of urban spaces as areas of wealth, prosperity, and innovation (Rieniets, 2009).

Fifth, scholars, mostly from a political science background, tend to espouse a narrative of 'Africa' as a place of grand and broad crisis (Myers, 2011, p. 3; Turok, 2014), repeatedly drowning in bloody conflicts, corruption, and favouritism (The Economist, 2000). On the contrary, international media and magazines such as TIME magazine and The Economist have recently praised Africa’s promise and rise, citing its enormous potential due to its disproportionately young population and ongoing urbanization process (The Economist, 2011; Perry, 2012; Haefliger, 2014). Legal reforms in many of these areas are geared towards accommodating the potential of this enormous population growth. This also applies to planning law, which has been used in the past to restrict social and economic opportunities for the majority of the population. Planning law provides the legal framework that
determines which urban plans are developed and essentially how urban areas are shaped: responsibilities, accountabilities, processes and legal status. It further determines which buildings and settlements are legal and which are not and it has frequently been used to demolish 'illegal' settlements, and evict residents (Nossiter, 2013; Berrisford, 2014). In Nigeria, the current Land Use Act of 1978 is enormously powerful; it grants the government control over the specific use of land in all parts of the country, thus determining the planning and zoning programme for all use.

De facto, the Land Use Act makes the government (or the governor, in Lagos State) the owner of all land (Aluko, 2012; Sadiq, 2011). 'Public interest' gives the governor the right to expropriate land and resettle people. Provided they can prove themselves the rightful holders of the respective land, they will be compensated. Informal settlements and 'slums' considered to be illegal (such as the case study discussed in this paper) have little legal power to claim land rights. The Ministry of Physical Planning and Urban Development is responsible for all physical planning, urban development, urban regeneration and building control policies of Lagos State under the framework conditions of the aforementioned Land Use Act (Urban and Regional Planning and Development Law 2010 No. C 41).

GOVERNANCE IN LAGOS

In 1960 Nigeria gained independence from Britain and became a federal republic in 1963, operating under a three-tier governmental system – federal, state and local government levels (Falola and Heaton, 2008, pp. xvi, 8). The nation is governed by a president, who is the head of state at federal level, while states are headed by governors and local government areas by chairmen. Lagos State was established in May 1967 and was Nigeria’s capital from 1914 to 1991 (Lagos State Government, 2012, p. 4). It is Nigeria’s largest city and regional economic hub, accounting for 90% of national foreign trade flows. Lagos is currently one of the three African megacities, along with Cairo and Kinshasa (United Nations 2014: 14). Data on the size of the population varies, depending on the source. Lagos State Government indicated the size of the population was ‘in excess of 18 million’ (Lagos State Government, 2012, p. 3), and is currently growing at a rate of 300,000 people annually (Burdett and Rode 2011, p. 8), or 3.9% per year (United Nations 2014, p. 26). Some estimates forecast population growth of more than 25 million, making it the ninth largest city in the world by 2030 (United Nations 2014, p. 26). Today 12.5% of Nigeria’s population live in Lagos, and among this population, two out of three live in informal settlements (Morakinyo et al., 2012, p. 5), based on the UN Habitat criteria on precarious settlements (UN Habitat, 2003). According to a survey by the National Bureau of Statistics (2010, p. 46) 2,307,281 persons, approximately 11.5% of the population, work in the informal sector. As of 2010, roughly 20% of Lagos’ population was either unemployed or engaged in informal employment. However, the transparency and accuracy of the data remains difficult to estimate.

As noted, many metropolitan areas are composed of several municipalities, as cities have grown beyond their historical and electoral boundaries. Consequently, contemporary city regions are often governed by multiple local governments (Moonen et al., 2014). The Lagos region has adjusted its administrative boundaries to bring the entire metropolitan population under a single jurisdiction, meaning all of the estimated 18 to 21.5 million people living in Lagos fall under the jurisdiction of the Governor of Lagos. However, it has been suggested that the closer the ‘fit’ between the number of people living within the administrative boundaries of the city and the metropolitan population, the more effectively the governance of the metropolitan region is managed (Burdett et al., 2014, p. 17). While Lagos is divided into 20 local government areas (LGAs), which are crucial for the state’s development, local government structures are weak. With a governor that wields considerable political power (Olorunmaiye, 2013), the elected heads of local government bodies are executive chairmen, comparable to district mayors but with very little policy-making influence (ELRI and CCDI, 2014, p. 10; Adeleke, 2014). Some people in Lagos call the chairmen ‘mayors’ and argue that the executive chairmen of Lagos should participate in international conferences such as C40, since they know what is really happening on the ground—and, hence, they are key trigger points for policy implementation, change and progress (Barber, 2013). As Lagos is growing not only in
population but in surface area as well, especially in the northeast and the southwest, it may be appropriate to seek more regional collaboration with neighbouring Ogun State (Salau et al., 2013), or even a fusion of the two states, as has been suggested by some (Datu, 2013).

In examining a city region like Lagos, categories and preconceptions of ‘city’, ‘city life’ and urbanization processes or perhaps ‘urban life’ are heavily challenged. Despite being one of the largest cities in the world, many places resemble a (giant) village with flat building structures and narrow streets. The micro-managed structure of what would generally be considered public services further exemplifies the ‘giant village’ nature of the city. Electricity provision in the state is insufficient; demand is estimated at 10,000 MW while the national grid only generates an approximate 4,500 MW annually (Lagos State Government, 2012b). While Lagos State runs a number of gas-powered independent power plants, this deficit is largely made up by privately owned diesel-powered generators.

Despite the 2007 Lagos Waste Management Authority Law, waste management remains a huge challenge. According to official data, Lagos generates 10,000 metric tonnes of waste daily (Lagos State Government, 2012a, p. 4). In addition, Lagos State has no piped wastewater system and households in upscale neighbourhoods usually use septic tanks. Lagos has only a few wastewater treatment plants, implemented in the mid-eighties. Their capacity for about 140,000 persons is grossly insufficient to serve a population the size of Lagos’ (that is constantly growing). While the World Bank recommends the implementation of policies that make it easier for vulnerable and less experienced workers to find jobs (World Bank et al., 2014/2015), the informal cart-pushers have been banned and all the waste management has to go through Lagos Waste Management Authority LAWMA; otherwise it is considered illegal.

In recent years, giant development projects, mostly financed through private and foreign capital, have been initiated. Despite this, planning processes lack transparency and it is hard to obtain official information. One such megaproject is Eko Atlantic City, built on land reclaimed from the Atlantic Ocean (Heinrich Böll Foundation Nigeria et al., 2012). Another example is the Lekki Free Trade Zone, currently under construction in the East of Lagos State. The social costs of projects like these are currently unknown but seen as critical, due to the lack of citizens’ involvement in the planning process and the complete privatization and gentrification of entire neighbourhoods (Sassen, 2014).

Towards a New Governance

Recent explorations on the future of cities and urban strategies evolve increasingly around ‘urban governance’, ‘the governance of cities’, or ‘urbanizing of government’ (Rode and Shankar, 2014). In order to tackle the aforementioned challenges in Lagos and against the backdrop of rapid urbanization and urban growth in Africa and Nigeria respectively, this paper postulates a governance approach that is closer to the needs and realities of everyday life—one which includes the integration of informal activities and structures, as opposed to excluding them. Governance, in this context, is understood as a shift from more formal structures of central management to processes through which the metropolitan or city region relates to their environment, not least in public service delivery. It also should be understood as processes through which public and private resources are coordinated in the pursuit of collective interests (Pierre, 2011). The argument is not that the suggested approach ought to replace the existing top-down model but rather that the two facets, state and society, should be integrated and interact better, conceptually and operationally (Pierre and Peters, 2005; Frug, 2011). Both the macro and micro levels must work together to achieve the quality of life desired by the residents of the city region, especially the disadvantaged, marginalized, vulnerable and poor (Hoelzel, 2013; Fabulous Urban, 2014; Srinivas, 2014).

Strategic planning at the metropolitan level of a large city region is complex, requiring leadership and strong coordination of policies across sectors (Floater et al., 2014). Nevertheless, despite the widespread acknowledgement that a prosperous city is more than ‘simple bricks and mortar’ (Williams 2011), too many mayors—or in Lagos, the governor—chase after the vision of ‘the beautiful city’, ‘Africa’s Model Megacity’ (Lagos State Government, 2012b; Lagos State Government, 2013). The argument is that the inclusion of the informal
workforce’s creativity and ingenuity would benefit all (Neuwirth, 2011, 2013; Satterthwaite, 2011, 2013; Hoelzel, 2013). In this sense, contemporary ‘multi-layer governance’ (Floater et al., 2014, p. 12) in Lagos needs stronger local governments and community-led governance models, which include the creation of jobs tailored to respective communities. Local governments have a key role in ensuring health, safety, and education, including building standards; land use planning and management; environmental, occupational and public health services; disaster prevention and preparedness (Satterthwaite et al., 2013). Today, governance in Lagos—what little exists of it—is too centralized to make a substantial difference, and is far too focused on the elite. This is further exacerbated by the deeply entrenched gap between government, elite, and the majority of the urban poor.

**MAKOKO**

The community of Makoko is a prime example of disproportionate growth amid rapid urbanisation in the developing world. Makoko is a waterfront community in the heart of the city which lies along the Lagos Lagoon. Historically a fishing community predating the establishment of Lagos State, Makoko has devolved into an urban slum over the years due to rural-urban migration and poorly governed development. It is a culturally diverse community with six main sub-communities, four main ethnic groups, three practiced religions and over five spoken languages, and despite the surrounding urbanization, traditional governance structures and rulers (baales) still exert an enormous amount of influence within the community. Its economic structure revolves around the use of water for fishing, boat making and craft. The community relies on basic traditional technology in the processing and production of its goods, contributing to slow economic growth.

With a population of approximately 50,000, Makoko is one of the largest low-income communities in Lagos. The World Bank, through the Lagos Metropolitan Development and Governance Project (LMDGP) intended to invest $40.9 million in upgrading nine selected slum neighbourhoods, including Makoko. However, the World Bank recently stopped the funding, and LMDGP was dissolved amid accusations that the project failed to properly apply the funding for its intended purposes. Additionally, the state government commenced the demolition of some of the 'illegal' structures in Makoko in 2012 and in Badia in 2013 (The World Bank, 2014) in preparation for new development. No accommodation was made for the resettlement or compensation of community members, which led to public backlash and eventually a court injunction to cease the demolitions (Akinsete et al., 2014). The resultant situation is one of deep-seated distrust, with the local citizens and informal institutions pitted firmly against the government and formal structures.

The state of governance in Makoko typifies the disconnect that exists between formal/top-down government institutions and local citizens. The case of the LMDGP’s misappropriated funds shows that international agencies and development banks need to rethink how they relate to the urban poor and organizations charged with engaging them. In most cases, official aid agencies and development banks do not implement initiatives on the ground, instead funding others to do so—and they are only as effective as the local institutions they fund. If the funded central or local governments have no relationships with, or accountability to, the local citizens, these international organizations—no matter how honest their intentions—reinforce undemocratic structures. The citizens of low-income communities are often acutely aware of what is required to improve their living conditions, generally needing relatively little funding. There is a need for local governments and institutions that listen and respond to local communities (particularly the urban poor), working in collaboration with them to develop appropriate solutions (Satterthwaite, 2011, 2013; Hoelzel, 2013; Fabulous Urban, 2014; Akinsete, et al. 2014).

**NEIGHBOURHOOD MANAGEMENT AS A MODEL FOR COMMUNITY-BASED GOVERNANCE**

In the new context of dynamic and rapidly evolving urban centres, community engagement and citizen participation are an essential component of urban governance models which are closer to the ground, more flexible and more responsive to local needs. Following the backlash resulting from the Makoko demolitions and the subsequent injunction, the state government expressed a willingness to consider alternative development plans for the area
proposed by the community. Lagos-based NGO the Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) brought together a multi-national and multi-disciplinary team mandated to work with the community to develop a ‘Sustainable Regeneration Plan’.

Exploring alternative governance structures was a key element of the ‘Sustainable Regeneration Plan’. The team aspired towards the integration of top-down and bottom-up community development, producing an alternative regeneration plan addressing the concerns of the community while meeting the ambitions of the state government. The results of an in-depth situational and needs analysis conducted as part of the process indicated that apart from basic infrastructure (such as sanitation, healthcare, housing, energy and education), community empowerment was identified as a priority area of concern (Makoko/Iwaya Waterfront Community, 2014). The team looked towards existing models of decentralized governance and development, exploring adaptations for the local context. Neighbourhood management was identified as a grassroots governance approach embedded within the community that could inform the development of a community-led governance model in Makoko.

Neighbourhood management aims to deliver urban governance at the local level, considering a holistic view of an area as opposed to along various strands. Originally developed in the UK as a means of delivering urban regeneration, this place-based approach seeks to ‘narrow the gap’ between deprived communities and affluent areas (CLG, 2008), an issue particularly relevant in Lagos, where the gap between the elite and the urban poor is extremely wide. The UK Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG) describes the process as bringing together ‘an alliance of three forces—representatives of the local community (including councillors), representatives of local service providers and a small professional team led by the Neighbourhood Manager to facilitate change’ (CLG, 2008, p.18). Essentially, neighbourhood management seeks to utilize a grassroots method of regeneration delivery where local services are pooled and brought into alignment with local community needs, thus making them more responsive. Neighbourhood management covers a wide scope of activities: from the work of estate wardens, caretakers and housing managers, to strategic planning and local governance, addressing issues including resident satisfaction and involvement, education, health, security, housing and employment (Power and Bergin, 1999; Brown, 2002). The objective of neighbourhood management is to create efficient service delivery within a particular geographic boundary, tailored to address the unique issues faced by its local community, thereby improving citizens’ quality of life. This highlights how the neighbourhood management model lends itself to the context of most developing nations where service delivery tends to operate on a micro-management level via informal structures.

The day-to-day operational process is overseen by a neighbourhood manager, who focuses on the ‘totality of place’ working in partnership with both the community and service providers to tackle local problems from the residents’ perspective. The Social Exclusion Unit (SEU) outlines a basic model (see Table 1) for neighbourhood management, which sets out five key features of neighbourhood management and four main tools for successful delivery. This model has formed the basis of the development of different place-based initiatives in the UK, such as the Pathfinder Programme and New Deal for Communities.
Table 1: Delivering Neighbourhood Management (Source: Social Exclusion Unit, 2001; CLG, 2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NEIGHBOURHOOD MANAGEMENT</th>
<th>FEATURES</th>
<th>TOOLS</th>
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<td></td>
<td>• Someone with overall responsibility at the neighbourhood level for managing the renewal process</td>
<td>• Agreements with service providers</td>
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<td>• Community involvement and leadership</td>
<td>• Devolved service delivery and purchasing</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• A systematic, planned approach to tackling local problems</td>
<td>• Pressure on agencies and government</td>
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<td>• Effective delivery mechanisms</td>
<td>• Special resources on enabling and cross-cutting activities</td>
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<td>• The tools to get things done</td>
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TRANSLATING NEIGHBOURHOOD MANAGEMENT TO DEVELOPING NATIONS

The existing gap between formal governance institutions and local citizens lies at the heart of the challenges faced by most low-income communities such as Makoko. To bridge this gap, the neighbourhood management model developed by the team in Makoko seeks to provide a framework to bring together various stakeholders within the community, empowering them to play a leading role in their own governance with support from Lagos State and other non-State institutions.

The key actors within this framework are:

- Local citizens (Makoko Community)
- Neighbourhood Managers: Newly-formed ‘Makoko/Iwaya Waterfront Development Association’ (charged with oversight of the Makoko community) and individuals (charged with oversight of different sub-communities)
- Traditional rulers (baales)
- Lagos State Government (and associated agencies and parastatals)
- Civil society groups
- Private investors
- Consultants
- Non-governmental agencies

The pivotal role of ‘neighbourhood manager’ is assumed by the newly established Makoko Community Development Association, which undertakes broad oversight on governance within the community. The Association acts as an interface between the formal and informal governance structures, and a point of convergence for all major stakeholders within, and without, the community (see Figure 1). The Association will have a Board of Directors comprising nine community members (sitting for a term of six years) including traditional rulers, leaders of
cooperative societies (trade associations), leader of the youth group, leader of the women’s group, and elected members of the community.

The main responsibilities of the Association include:

- Cooperating with agencies and institutions responsible for collaborative community service delivery
- Mobilizing community members to participate in sustainable development of the community
- Constituting active community members into committees for development and management of different spheres of the community
- Mobilizing groups (particularly youth and women) for relevant skills acquisition and training
- Maintaining channels for community feedback, primarily through neighbourhood managers, to monitor community needs and priorities
- Collating, retaining and updating database of development activities (physical, social and economic) within the community
- Providing a platform for community members, in collaboration with relevant government agencies, to coordinate, monitor and assess community development activities
- Mobilizing resources (community and otherwise) towards establishing an Environmental Protection Fund

Figure 1: Delivering Neighbourhood Management in Makoko (Source: Makoko/Iwaya Waterfront Community, 2014)

The Association will provide a strong institutional platform to oversee community development underpinned by the activities of various standing committees (see Figure 1). The core committees include Lands and Housing, Environment, Security and Safety, and Welfare and Community Services, with provision for the creation of additional
committees depending on community needs. Each of the committees shall comprise of no more than 5 community members, including one traditional ruler (baale) and at least one woman.

Figure 2: The Makoko Community Development Association within the Community (Source: Makoko/Iwaya Waterfront Community, 2014)

![Diagram of the Makoko Community Development Association](image)

A key element of the neighbourhood management approach adopted in Makoko is about tapping into the power of self-organization to create multi-faceted solutions to address complex issues, leverage challenges as opportunities and turn the lack of infrastructure into a source of income. Emphasis is placed on sustainability and maximizing value chains within waste-to-wealth cycles to address some of the largest challenges on the planet — environmental protection, economic development and social equity. One example of this micro-management and micro-funding approach in action is the Neighbourhood Hotspot developed under the Makoko Sustainable Regeneration Plan.

The Neighbourhood Hotspot is essentially a physical manifestation of the principles of neighbourhood management — a coordinated approach to service delivery at local level, which is inclusive of residents in order to maximise benefits for the local community. Taking a holistic view of community governance and development, the Neighbourhood Hotspot offers appropriate and community-led integrated service provision, via flexible infrastructure, within a framework that accommodates existing community structures. With waste-management and energy provision constituting key community concerns, the Neighbourhood Hotspot is a piece of dynamic renewable energy infrastructure: a biogas plant generating energy from organic waste, with a structure serving as a community centre and a nucleus for local services — grassroots healthcare delivery, training and development, community cooking and urban gardening (Akinsete, et al., 2014). It is an approach to new ways of providing basic infrastructure and services for all, against the backdrop of a central government that is struggling to do so.

The Swiss Embassy in Abuja agreed to fund one pilot Neighbourhood Hotspot and on December 15 2014, an agreement was signed with the Union of Ogu Baales of Makoko. A Memorandum of Understanding covering the ownership, operation, and use of the Neighbourhood Hotspot has been signed between the urban design agency,
DESIGN MATTERS: SHAPING SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE

The Neighbourhood Hotspot is simultaneously a business incubator, a place for social exchange and a knowledge centre for renewable energy production, waste management, urban gardening and water harvesting—a truly public and social infrastructure that empowers the community. The construction of the structure is simple and based on sustainable, local and indigenous methods of building with wood on stilts. This not only creates the opportunity to showcase climate resilient construction techniques, but the combination of traditional construction methods and local materials engages local artisans in the process, thereby generating jobs and building on local capability. In addition to a biogas plant and kiosk, each Neighbourhood Hotspot has the potential to incorporate a range of different activities, providing space for urban gardening, workshop and cooking facilities, doctor’s offices and reading rooms (Fabulous Urban 2014; Fabulous Urban and Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2014; Akinsete et al., 2014) (see Figures 3-6).

Figure 3: The Makoko Neighbourhood Hotspot with local waste-recycling economy  (Source: Fabulous Urban, 2014)
Figure 4: The Makoko Neighbourhood Hotspot: close-up (Source: Fabulous Urban, 2014)

Figure 5: The Makoko Neighbourhood Hotspot: integrated rainwater harvesting system (Source: Fabulous Urban, 2014)
As discussed, with all the dialogue and literature regarding smart cities, better cities, and future cities, there is an increasing—and absolutely justified—debate on urban governance, urban management, and policy-making that requires the collaboration of professionals from various disciplines. This last section discusses the importance of design, highlighting the role of designers in solving issues and challenges raised (MoMA, 2011; Lepik, 2011; Lepik, 2013; Hoelzel, 2013).

From the premise of a democratic society, the key to successful urban governance, management, planning and design may lie in the ability to bring together people from different backgrounds with different interests within a complex network (De Landa, 1997; Hoelzel, 2014). Architects and designers are inherently hands-on ‘troubleshooters’, harnessing the propensity to make conflicts spatially productive. Urban design and spatial planning is not ‘moderated’ or ‘managed’ but rather ‘practiced’ and ‘facilitated’ (fuelling discussion on the role of the designer as ‘moderator of social change’). This ‘need to implement’ intrinsically constitutes the major contribution of the profession to improving cities. The smartest and best-intended policies are useless without implementation. The manner in which urban spaces are designed, built and materialized contributes a great deal to the success of urban strategies and governance: good design is the structural embodiment of good urban governance.

As noted, in order to realize projects like the Neighbourhood Hotspot in low-income environments such as Makoko, it is absolutely crucial to involve the future users, local citizens, at a very early stage. Furthermore, it is necessary to think collectively about the project outcomes and how these can be achieved. Anything less will likely result in failure, as illustrated in the case of the Ashogbon market in the Ilaje and Bariga communities, opened in June 2009 by Lagos State Government. Ilaje and Bariga were two of the nine officially designated slum areas in Lagos that
received funding under the LMDGP before the programme was terminated (World Bank, 2014). Intended as a fish market, today it is used as a junkyard for car parts (see Figures 7 and 8).

It is clear that the location, the design and the requirements of the planned functions were not sufficiently discussed with the local community beforehand. The populace’s needs in pursuance of their fishing-related businesses such as trading and selling were not understood, which should be the core task of designers. Such processes may be lengthy, difficult and troublesome but they are necessary for the success and long-term sustainability of such projects.

Figure 7: Ashogbon Market in Ilaje-Bariga (Source: Fabienne Hoelzel, picture from 17th Dec. 2014)

Figure 8: Ashogbon Market in Ilaje-Bariga (Source: Fabienne Hoelzel, picture from 17th Dec. 2014)
The importance of creating jobs and steady incomes to tackle urban poverty and ensure sustainable urban regeneration has previously been highlighted. It is fundamental to developing economic measures based on the socio-spatial conditions of respective communities. Before implementing projects like the Ilaje-Bariga fish market or the Neighbourhood Hotspot, it is important to develop operation and management systems. Is the design carried out in a way that people can easily understand and integrate into their operational and business structures? Is the design responding to needs? Are questions of ownership and responsibility clarified? The task and role of designers should be to pro-actively engage and participate in these stakeholder and actor-network processes to achieve good urban design and smart solutions that will make a real difference to society. Therefore, irrespective of how small these projects may be, they will respond to global policy requirements, formulated by the World Bank, United Nations and other such agencies.

It may be a daring thesis, but the lack of 'good governance' due to overcharged central or local governments, missing instruments and weak institutions—against the backdrop of rapidly growing city regions like Lagos—may open new spaces for thinking and action for designers. To conclude, the prevailing discourse about 'good' and 'new' urban governance is ineffective if policy-makers, politicians, sociologists and urban planners do not work closely and collaboratively: 'horizontally' across disciplines and 'vertically' across hierarchies in governments and organizations. The role of the designer is particularly suited to navigate and mediate between the macro, meso and micro levels since they direct experience through their work, the impacts of the 'global' in the 'mundane' (Acuto, 2014). As argued, the integration of 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' approaches is essential to urban and slum regeneration. Carefully designed social infrastructure can be key catalysts for change. They cannot and shall not replace policies but rather complement them. This, however, requires designers interested in working at the intersections of governance, planning and design—who are willing to go beyond conventional roles (Hoelzel, 2015; Van Wezemael, 2014).

The challenges ahead—in the context of rapid urbanization, massive urban growth and urban poverty—are huge. They require change not only at national and global levels, but also at community and household level. There is growing discourse on good governance and smart policy-making, yet international organizations and central and local governments do not work closely enough with local citizens, particularly within low-income groups and informal settlements (Satterthwaite, 2011), thus leaving such groups without the capacity to adopt these policies. In conclusion, we need governance that is delivered with the people and not to the people.

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Abstract
The assessment of priority setting can lead to innovative health governance by clarifying the performance of national health systems in resource poor countries, particularly in Africa. As a means to link research to action, assessing priority setting can ensure that the needs of the very poor to access personal and public services to control neglected tropical diseases (NTDs) are considered. Controlling NTDs effectively can contribute to uplifting the health status of the African people, further, it can build human capacity to confront the numerous contemporary health challenges and efficiently seize the emerging socio-economic opportunities across the continent. Based on a literature review, this paper reveals that there is little attention paid to the assessment of priority setting in national health systems, particularly in the area of research governance regarding NTDs. Much literature about research governance focuses on research that prioritizes cost-effectiveness. Overemphasized are guidelines about accountability, transparency and efficiency, at the expense of research into the underlying health determinants to control NTDs that produce unequal health outcomes in populations. Reducing population health outcomes that are avoidable is an issue of equity. Based on existing knowledge, this paper proposes a framework to assess priority setting which links research to action in controlling NTDs by incorporating health determinants. The framework, which focuses on the processes and outcomes of priority setting, could be adapted to other health sectors. It remains important to test the proposed framework empirically.
Neglected tropical diseases (NTDs) are a diverse group of diseases with distinct characteristics that are rarely prevalent in developed nations. NTDs affect more than 1.4 billion people living on less than USD 1.25 a day mainly in Africa (Skolnik and Ahmed, 2010, p.1; World Health Organization, 2013). While that is so, priority setting to control NTDs receives very little attention within health systems of poor countries in the area of research governance. Research governance is the organized institutional social response to generate resources relating to knowledge production to deal with health conditions in health care systems and public health management (London and Frenk, 1997). Much of the literature about research governance focuses on ideas and imperatives to ensure accountability, transparency and efficiency in health research (Walsh, Mcneil and Breen, 2005; Poustie et al., 2006; Crammond et al., 2011; Rani, Bekedam and Buckley, 2011). Lacking are empirical studies to assess priority setting to control NTDs. ‘A “priority” is, very simply, a fact or condition that is more important than another’ (WHO, 2009, p.2). Priority setting in health care is commonly defined as ‘the process for making decisions over the allocation of population health care resources’ (Lafi, Robinson and Williams, 2012, p.771).

This paper situates itself in Health Governance and Public Health Management. The main objective is to examine how priorities in research governance are set to control NTDs, which are elaborated further below. Priority setting is an important precursor in ensuring research is linked to action in the control of health issues such as NTDs. This will be an important component in building the human capacity necessary to confront numerous health challenges and to seize emerging socio-economic opportunities across the African continent.

In a framework to assess country-level efforts to link research to action, Lavis et al. (2006), for instance, identified four elements. The general climate for research use; the relevance and quality of the research produced; the mix of clusters of activities involved and the evaluation of all these factors. Relying on this framework, this paper proposes to carry out a literature review in order to achieve the above objective by specifically focusing on priority setting to control NTDs in Africa. In so doing, this paper will reveal the little attention paid to the assessment of priority setting in knowledge production to fight NTDs. Although the proximal causes of NTDs are known to be parasites and bacteria (Skolnik and Ahmed, 2010), the modifiable upstream risks are rarely researched (through scoping, systematic reviews and primary studies). Most of these risks relate to underlying social determinants of health (SDH) or health determinants such as the unsanitary living conditions among the poor, lack of clean water or access to quality care (Rudan et al., 2011).

This paper begins by situating priority setting within a more analytical understanding of research governance. It goes on to show that the general climate relating to research use in Africa directs much attention to the investigation of efficiency regarding research funding. The paper proceeds to demonstrate that research to increase cost-effective interventions in controlling NTDs remains essential, but the underlying health determinants are rarely investigated. Such information could provide knowledge useful to prioritizing research that is able to innovate governance in health to fight against NTDs. The four clusters of activities, proposed by Lavis et al. (2006), involved in linking research to action are discussed, pointing out the problems they present within the African context. Lastly, based on various studies (Gibson et al., 2002; Sibbald et al., 2010), the paper suggests a framework to evaluate priority setting to link research to action taking into account health determinants in specific contexts. I suggest that priority setting is essential to link health research to action and spearhead innovative governance in health able to eliminate NTDs. As an example, I argue for the assessment of priority setting as a prerequisite in strengthening research governance to identify and effectively address health determinants. This will enhance the capacity of health systems by innovating ways that increase greater coverage and reduce costs to prevent and control NTDs in Africa.

**Priority Setting and Research Governance to Control NTDs**

Priority setting is one of the most important functions in the governance or stewardship of national health systems. It relates particularly to resource generation (Murray and Frenk, 2000). For our purposes, resource generation shall refer to the production of knowledge to control NTDs in the health system. Health systems implement health
action, which is any set of activities undertaken by an organization of the system to improve or maintain population health (Murray and Frenk, 2000). Two essential analytical dimensions define health action in a health system. The health conditions and the way in which organizations in a state respond to those conditions (Frenk and Moon, 2013 p.936). Conditions in this study refer to NTDs and the risk factors involved.

Mainstream governance theorists are said to conceptualize the state as a neutral entity, which acts on behalf of the public interest (Lemke, 2007). Critics of this view point to policies or measures that often suit powerful social state actors, even if they impose losses on the majority (Mahon, 1997; Graefe, 2007) raising questions about the notion that the state designs policy to ensure some transcendent public interest. If decision making in public policy is an act of power rather than simply an exercise of sorting and evaluating options, then state governance, which appears neutral, can perpetuate social inequalities. At issue is explaining how such inequalities arise (Mahon, 1997 p.194). A possible explanation is that the state does not act but rather social forces act through the state (Graefe, 2007). These forces may be networks of individuals and organizations. Networks include researchers, advocates, policy-makers and technical officials working, for instance, on NTDs. Organizations may include government and non-governmental organizations, such as United Nations agencies, foundations and donor agencies. Given this scenario, priority setting to deal with NTDs occurs in unequal power structures.

Even so, critics argue that the tendency to over-emphasize governance from the perspective of the rulers, programmers and planners alone disregards empirical reality or the inevitable gap between what is attempted and what is accomplished (Mahon, 1997). For instance, large populations are often outside the state decision-making processes. A clear example is the clientelistic practices in Africa, where patrimonial relationships based on ethnicity lead to patterns of personal dependency on the decision making power of politicians (Bierschenk and de Sardan, 2003). It implies that such governance leads to a form of social exclusion. This is especially so where participation in decision-making concerning the governance of public services is monopolised by those considered to possess the necessary expertise (Mahon, 1997). Exclusion can also be based on gender, limiting mainly the participation of women in decision making processes (McBride, 1996). According to Sen (2000 p. 27), social exclusion raises questions about the relational obstacles to be overcome, if policymaking is to be improved. For our purposes, these obstacles relate to setting priorities in research governance that would shape policy that answers to the needs of the very poor greatly affected by NTDs in Africa. In this study, governance is understood as the totality of ways in which a society organizes and collectively manages its affairs, beyond the formal mechanisms of government (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 1997), particularly in the health system. Thus, governance in a health system can be understood as the organized institutional social response to a series of conditions which constitute health needs among various population groups (London and Frenk, 1997 p. 7), in this study, NTDs in Africa.

Any health system of a state performs various functions. London and Frenk (1997) identify four basic functions. These are financing, provision of personal and public health services, stewardship and resource generation (human, physical and knowledge). The main sub-functions include: overall system design, performance assessment, priority setting, inter-sectoral advocacy, regulation and consumer protection (Murray and Frenk, 2000). Priority setting, the main focus of this paper, involves two major governance related elements, namely, choosing criteria for setting priorities and building a consensus around them (Murray and Frenk, 2000). Thus, to assess priority setting in health governance requires, first, an analytical understanding of research governance. This is so because consensus building involves diverse stakeholders having strong links to research and action in health governance. Second, building a consensus seems to occur in unequal relations. An analytical awareness of the political nature of these processes is required to understand how choices are made about the personal and public services to control NTDs, such as which are considered most important to be investigated or acted upon.

Studies about research governance draw from various frameworks firmly established in Western countries such as in the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada (Canada Interagency Advisory Panel on Research Ethics, 2009; Taylor, 2002). The main ideas guiding research governance in these frameworks are namely: coordination, monitoring and regulation of health research, especially in the wake of evidence-based policy making (Canada...
Research to control NTDS: efficiency in health systems

Research governance includes activities by the funders of research, universities and how researchers and users of research support or place value on efforts to link research to action (Lavis et al., 2006). In this section, I briefly point out that according to the literature reviewed, the general climate of research governance relating to NTDS reveals two issues. The first one is the predominant preoccupation with efficiency in decision-making concerning funding (Sridhar and Batniji, 2008; Moran et al., 2009; World Health Organization, 2012). Emphasis is put on research regarding cost-effective interventions to achieve greater coverage in low-resource settings (Bryce et al., 2003). The second issue is that domestic investments into research have to compete with resources needed to deliver health services (Ezeh et al., 2010). Some examples of other neglected diseases can shed light on these issues. Childhood diseases, such as pneumonia and diarrhoea, combined, are reported to cause more child deaths each year globally than deaths to smoking in all ages annually, or twice as many annual deaths as HIV/AIDS worldwide (Rudan et al., 2007). Child deaths occur mainly in developing countries. For instance, according to the WHO (2014) children in sub-Saharan Africa alone were more than 15 times more likely to die from these diseases before the age of five than children in developed regions. Yet pneumonia, meningitis, and diarrhoea get less donor funding compared to HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis, which together are reported to get about 80 percent of the money (Enserink, 2009). Interestingly, in a research priority setting process about childhood pneumonia, ‘barriers to care-seeking’ was the highest ranked issue, which is rarely given high funding priority by international agencies (Rudan et al., 2011). These findings have significant implications for priority setting regarding effective interventions to prevent neglected diseases.

Research to determine risk distribution of severe pneumonia and the health determinants shaping the referral of sick children to a hospital would, for instance, be most answerable to the needs of the poor in Africa. Also, it is most likely to be effective and carries the greatest potential for reducing the disease burden in poor populations. The mal-distribution of health care or not delivering care to those most in need is a health determinant (WHO Commission on Social Determinants, 2008, p.1). Systematic differences in access to health determinants, such as health care, shape unequal health outcomes and are likely to result in the persistence of neglected diseases in poor populations. In this situation, the evaluation of priority setting to control NTDS becomes essential. Sibbald et al. (2010) reveal the purpose of evaluating priority setting as to provide any organization with a simple, practical
way to better understand what it means to achieve success in its priority setting activities. Areas for scaling-up or improving equitable access to services can be identified.

I am suggesting that the assessment of priority setting can spearhead innovative governance in health through providing information about existing research gaps. Knowledge about missing data may inform a research agenda or research questions that prioritize enquiry specifically into health determinants (Snilstveit et al., 2013:7). On the basis of such knowledge, research use could be strengthened by accelerating the implementation of policies and strategies that combat exclusionary dynamics. These increase the burden of NTDs among the very poor in Africa. According to Lavis et al. (2006), the second element in assessing country-level efforts to link research to action addresses priority setting in the production of research to ensure the needs of users are identified and addressed in scoping reviews, systematic reviews and single studies.

**Priority Setting in the Production of Knowledge**

Resource allocation in health care is considered the most important task in health system governance (Lafi, Robinson and Williams, 2012). The model widely used by public agencies in the West to study priority setting in health care is the ‘accountability for reasonableness’ (Daniels and Sabin, 1997). This model has been used to study priority setting not only in the West but also in Africa (Kapiriri et al., 2007). According to this model, the goal for priority setting is legitimacy and fairness built on four conditions (Daniels and Sabin, 1997). The relevance condition is about ‘fair-minded’ people agreeing upon decisions based on reasons (i.e., evidence, principles, arguments) to meet the diverse needs of a covered population under the necessary resource constraints. The publicity condition specifies that these limit-setting decisions should be transparent and publicly accessible. The appeals condition requires mechanisms for conflict resolution and revision in light of further evidence or arguments. The last condition is enforcement either voluntary or public to regulate the process and ensure the first three conditions are met. Gibson et al. (2002) argue that the four conditions lead to six domains of reasons, people, appeals, institutions, processes and factors, shown in the diamond (Figure 1) below.

**Figure 1: Accountability for reasonableness framework** (adapted from Gibson et al., 2002).

These domains can be empirically investigated to evaluate priority setting for our purposes concerning the control of NTDs. Table 1 below indicates the prevalence of 8 of the 17 parasitic and bacterial infections considered NTDs (Skolnik and Ahmed, 2010; WHO, 2013).
Table 1: Major Neglected Tropical Diseases (NTDs) Ranked by Prevalence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disease</th>
<th>Global Prevalence in millions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ascariasis (Roundworm)</td>
<td>807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trichuriasis (Hipworm)</td>
<td>604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hookworm Infection</td>
<td>576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schis-tosomiasis (snail fever)</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lymphatic filariasis (elephantiasis)</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blinding Trachoma</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oncho-cerciasis (river blindness)</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leishmaniasis</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Skolnik and Ahmed (2010 p. 1). (Not indicated in the table are five other NTDs, each affecting less than 10 million, namely: Chagas disease 8-9 Million; Leprosy 0.4M; Human African trypanosomiasis 0.02M; Dracunculiasis 0.01M; Buruli ulcer not determined. The rest of the NTDs are Dengue, Rabies, Foodborne trematodiases, Yaws.)

Seven of the most common NTDs (Ascariasis 807 million, Trichuriasis 604m, Hookworm 576m, Schis-tosomiasis 207m; Lymphatic Filariasis 120m; Blinding Trachoma 41m; Oncho-cerciasis 37m) can be found in a number of resource poor countries, but primarily in Africa. NTDs are prevalent especially in subtropical and tropical climates and are considered diseases of poverty, affecting nearly everyone in the ‘bottom billion’ of the poorest people (Skolnik and Ahmed, 2010). WHO (2015) has reported a number of successes. In 2014, only 126 cases of dracunculiasis were reported, signalling its eradication. In 2013 and 2014, Colombia and Ecuador eliminated onchocerciasis, respectively. Bangladesh and Nepal are said to be in position to eliminate visceral leishmaniasis by the end of 2015. Also, new cases of human African trypanosomiasis have dropped to fewer than 10,000 annually, with 6,314 cases reported in 2013 (WHO, 2015).

Despite the above successes, women and children living in unhygienic environments with limited access to clean water and sanitary methods of waste disposal continue to be overrepresented in populations blinded, disfigured, disabled and killed by NTDs (Skolnik and Ahmed, 2010; WHO, 2013; 2015). Additionally, recent studies have shown that many people have one or more NTDs at the same time as they have HIV or malaria, worsening the intensity of those diseases (Skolnik and Ahmed, 2010, p. 2). Similarly, many of NTDs cause disability and disfigurement, which can be a source of social stigma leading to isolation in families and communities. NTDs affect not only health and wellbeing, but also the productivity of individuals and the economy (Skolnik and Ahmed, 2010, p. 2). Furthermore, NTDs have the potential to spread, as Ebola has recently demonstrated. Moreover, increasing global warming implies that NTDs may no longer be limited to tropical regions. Another clear example is dengue found in more than 150 countries (WHO, 2015). Thus, population movement and environmental change are among factors facilitating expansion of diseases spread by insects.

Priority setting to control such NTDs face major challenges arising from issues of legitimacy and fairness in the context of unequal power differences. Put differently, the ‘relevant reasons’ that inform priority setting, even when based on high quality evidence, may be pre-determined as a function of power differences. Power differences may, for instance, occur between the capacity of funders in terms of financial prowess, the professional status of researchers, the influential position of policy makers and the less powerful research users or the very poor in Africa. Age, gender, and ethnicity, as already observed, may constitute other pathways through which exclusionary dynamics resulting from unequal relations within state governance are expressed. It means that priority setting during consensus building can be controversial. Some individuals and groups among various public health agency sectors and actors are better positioned than others to influence the outcomes. Information about these processes
in Africa can be practical to facilitate linking research to action and enable the application of high quality evidence to control NTDs. According to Lavis et al (2006), a third element in assessing country-level efforts to link research to action addresses four clusters of activities, indicated in Table 2 below.

Table 2. Linking research to action against NTDs: the four clusters of activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster of Activities</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Push efforts’</td>
<td>Strategies to support action based on messages from research.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Push efforts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘User pull’</td>
<td>‘One-stop shopping’: optimally packaged high-quality reviews in ‘teachable moments’ - intense media coverage, and rapid-response units meet users’ needs for the best research.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>User pull</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘User pull efforts’</td>
<td>By users of research and structures and processes to support use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange efforts</td>
<td>Meaningful partnerships between researchers and users help them to jointly ask and answer relevant questions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange Efforts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The cluster of systematic ‘push efforts’ in Table 2 identifies actionable messages using various strategies. These efforts, for example, support action based on focused messages from systematic reviews. The cluster of ‘user pull’ activities involves optimally packaged reviews of high quality and relevance put at the disposal of those supporting action based research. The cluster of ‘user pull’ efforts refers to how users evaluate their capacity to appropriate and apply research, such as combining the evidence with other types of information to promote the use of research in decision-making. This activity calls for developing structures and processes to help users acquire the required competences. The cluster of ‘exchange efforts’ involves building relationships and partnerships among researchers and research users around single studies, programmes of research, or systematic reviews. In that way, they can collectively ask and answer locally relevant questions, such as those facilitating the setting of priorities.

These four clusters of activities present various problems in linking research to action in the African context. The cluster of ‘push efforts’ to provide actionable messages to control NTDs, for instance, raises the question of ‘whose’ reasons are relevant to decide what should be actionable messages or the priority message. Similarly, in ‘the user pull’ activities concerning high quality reviews, who decides what constitutes the subject of a high quality review useful to control NTDs? This is important because most of the centres of excellence, including the best universities that drive research, are concentrated in the rich industrialized countries, highlighting inequalities in the global knowledge economy. By contrast, African universities are characterized by poor research infrastructure and management (Ezeh et al., 2010). Similarly, ‘user pull efforts’ present problems concerning the structures and processes available to do so in Africa. The shortage of senior African social scientists available to lead or manage research undermines the ability of Africa to interpret and solve its socio-economic and public health problems. Wright, Ahiikire and Kwegiska (2014) show that much social science research in Africa is conducted in the form of small, individual consultancy projects. While this may be a positive step in the right direction, questions remain about the real contribution of these projects in building strong institutional research capacities to strengthen the prevention and control of diseases, specifically NTDs.
In addition to the institutional problems raised by ‘user pull efforts’, exchange efforts present issues of a different nature. Specifically, do partnerships in exchange efforts involving a broad range of stakeholders imply automatically achieving the goal of legitimacy of having fair-minded participants? This is important because the issue of who should be included in the process is different from whoever is included should contribute to enhancing the priority setting decisions (Sibbald et al., 2010). Put differently, are the voices of the very poor burdened with NTDs in specific contexts heard in research? This is important in light of additional obstacles raised by some researchers. Stewart and Sewankambo (2010), for instance, observe a fundamental collision of the logic of biomedical research with the logic of local social relationships in Africa. They show that researchers in Africa perform their role as a transaction, while the participants expect transformative actions after their participation in research. It implies that developing and implementing effective interventions call for evaluating priority setting to clarify the above problems. This is a precursor to innovative health governance that promotes health equity. A fourth element in linking research to action addresses approaches that support country-level rigorous evaluations (Lavis et al., 2006).

Evaluations of efforts to link research to action against NTDs

Rudan et al. (2007) observe that evaluations of existing health interventions are rarely seen as a research priority by funders. Despite that, there are various examples to show that research evaluations have contributed to improvements in health. For instance, routine use of Vitamin A treatment to reduce the incidence of both blindness and fatality as well as to better outcomes in HIV infected children with diarrhoea have improved child health in Africa (Dabis et al., 2002). The routine use of Vitamin A resulted from evaluations of evidence-based interventions from observational studies that revealed the success such interventions. Additionally, the clinical use of antiretroviral treatment to prevent mother to child transmission of HIV has improved child health in Africa. It has been facilitated by evaluations from observational studies that have demonstrated its effectiveness (Dabis et al., 2002). Furthermore, evaluations based on research contributed to the development of low cost interventions against malaria such as the use of insecticide-treated nets (Dabis et al., 2002). In these cases, evaluations led to further research, which was described as fundamental to later improvements. If that is the case, a common conceptual framework for evaluating priority setting would be useful to account for the successes and failures to deal with health issues in Africa. A framework to evaluate priority setting of NTDs could be adapted to other areas in the health system. Given the contextual differences in which, for instance, NTDs are experienced, it remains difficult to reach a consensus about the meaning of successful priority setting. As a result, any framework to evaluate priority setting should take into account the specific context in which those greatly affected with NTDs live in Africa.

**Framework for evaluating priority setting to control NTDs**

Gibson et al. (2002) propose a trans-disciplinary model to evaluate priority setting that incorporates both ethical and empirical considerations. From this perspective, the assessment of priority setting need not only include the dominant economist’s view where legitimate priority setting is based solely on cost effective analyses grounded on rational assumptions. Other disciplines with different ethical traditions, particularly that of health equity, are included to shape the assessment of priority setting. The WHO Commission on Social Determinants of Health (2008) considers health inequities to be systematic differences in health care that are unfair and unjust, if they can reasonably be avoided. This study proposes a framework in Table 3 below including ethical principles to evaluate priority setting to control NTDs based on the six domains previously referred to from Gibson et al. (2002), namely: reasons, people, appeals, institutions, processes and factors.
Table 3. Framework to assess priority setting to control NTDs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements</th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Process</strong></td>
<td>People who should be included beyond whoever can contribute</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Reasons - consideration of dominant ideas, as well as clear and transparent information management</td>
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<td>Institutional framework across various sectors</td>
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<td>Values - political environment</td>
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<td><strong>Outcome</strong></td>
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<td>Greater understanding of needs</td>
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<td>Equity relating to access to health determinants/socio-demographic factors (age, gender and ethnicity and others)</td>
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<td>Reallocation of resources according to needs</td>
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An evaluation framework proposed by Sibbald et al. (2010), which this study has adapted, has two important dimensions: the process and outcome. The process includes the procedures involved in the priority setting such as choosing the participants or people to participate in decision-making. In the framework above, the question that needs to be asked is who should be included. Additionally, it is important to inquire about which dominant ideas (such as efficiency, equity and cost-effectiveness) informed the process. This is important to identify the research gaps particularly regarding what health determinants relating to NTDs were left out. Questions about information management are essential, specifically regarding clarity and transparency, the disclosure of conflicts of interest, fair access to decision-makers, and fair chairing and leadership of the priority setting group. Since Africa clearly has weak infrastructure to support centers of research excellence, assessment of priority setting should include questions about the interactions between the existing institutional frameworks or sectors to find out how they fulfill their mandate of setting priorities. Variations between institutional cultures do affect priority setting (Gibson et al., 2002) during consensus building. The use of deliberative processes may transcend some of the difficulties encountered in consensus building. It means that questions should be raised about the explicit process concerning whether state officials, the external advisers and the local population collaborated to acquire and use the best available evidence to inform decisions, for instance, about the coverage for health services or the allocation of resources for personal and public services.

A major difficulty is that deliberative exchanges between researchers, public health actors, members of civil society and all other interested parties involve values. Values shape deliberations. Questions should be raised about the values that determined the decision making to control NTDs in a specific context. These can also refer to factors that include among others benefit, cost, evidence, arguments, principles, cost-effectiveness and equity considered important by priority setting decision-makers (Gibson et al., 2002). Other questions should be asked about whether the priority setting was open to review. Thus, a process to assess priority setting should be comprehensive and evidence-informed (Sibbald et al., 2010, p. 2).

The outcomes of the priority setting process are important. Priority setting should inquire about the effect of decisions to increase the coverage of treatment to control NTDs and if there was a greater understanding of the needs of the beneficiaries across the socio-demographic factors. It is also important to ask if the re-allocation of the resources was based on the personal and public needs of the specific population. A major weakness of this framework is its normativity. It should be tested empirically to generate evidence that can link research to action to control NTDs in real world conditions, taking into account health determinants.
CONCLUSION

By situating priority setting within a more analytical understanding of research governance, this paper demonstrated the weak institutional research capacities within an unequal global knowledge economy, which define the general climate regarding health research use in Africa. The production of knowledge is often governed by research that prioritizes cost-effectiveness focusing on guidelines about accountability, transparency and efficiency at the expense of research into the underlying health determinants. The assessment of priority setting can lead to innovative governance in health by providing the required information to link research to action in order to strengthen the capacity for prevention and control of NTDs. The framework to evaluate priority setting accounting for health determinants is only a proposal and an initial attempt to ensure that the very poor have access to the personal and public services they need to control NTDs. The framework needs to be tested in the real world in which the very poor live to collect data about health determinants across socio-demographic indices such as gender, age, and ethnicity.

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Turning challenges into opportunities in urban water governance: The case of Greater Maputo

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Abstract

Intense urbanization in African cities challenges the provision of water services. International development cooperation promotes water infrastructure projects to increase cities’ resilience and to address the historical inequalities in water access and distribution. However, those projects fail to effectively implement the decentralization and public participation principles advanced for urban water management with the shift from ‘government to governance’. This failure – aligned with the donor push for the replication of the modern infrastructure ideal in the interventions designed for African cities – prevents international development cooperation and African policy-makers from promoting innovative water governance and long lasting structural changes. Hence, this paper adopts a politicized perspective of water governance to review the decision-making process for improving urban water supply in Greater Maputo, Mozambique. I argue that the shift to participatory water governance is only apparent on paper and, as a result, donor interventions do not recognize and support innovative governance at the local level. This case study leads to the conclusion that investments in capacity building for water governance and the promotion of social entrepreneurship for the provision of water services could be employed as means to turn the challenge of sustainable water provision into opportunities to address the social and economic development needed for African cities.

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INTRODUCTION
African cities are under pressure to reduce climate vulnerability while providing water for all. Given that over half of the world’s population live in urban centres, and 91 per cent of the estimated increase will take place in the Global South, the provision of urban infrastructure for water supply and sanitation is ‘bedrock for prosperity’ (UN-Habitat, 2012). In international development cooperation, the capacity of African cities to cope with climate change and secure urban water supply is discussed in terms of the infrastructure-related indicators. These indicators assess the performance of the state-regulated water networks: coverage rates, meters of pipeline and number of water treatment plants (WHO and UNICEF, 2013). This technocratic approach has shaped water management and infrastructure development worldwide (Castro, 2007; Swyngedouw, 2004).

However, like most cities in the Global South, African cities are still far from replicating the modern urban infrastructure ideal derived from the experience of providing services in the Global North (Anand, 2011; Gandy, 2004). Central to urban planning movements in the construction of modern nation states, this ideal privileges the advance of uniform coverage of public services by a single infrastructure network under centralised management (Furlong, 2014; Graham and Marvin, 2001). It holds that the modern city is ‘a networked city with infrastructure monopolies providing standardized and universal services’ (Ahlers et al., 2012: 3), which would secure control of access to and allocation of resources. The consolidated urban centres in the Global North illustrate the urban planning attempts to implement this ideal. Nevertheless, the water landscape of African cities is characterized by a fragmentation in the distribution of water infrastructure (pipes, dams, treatment plants), management models (private, community-run, state) and water sources (groundwater, surface water, bottled water) (Bakker, 2010; Collingon and Vézina, 2000; Matsinhe et al., 2008). Aiming to overcome this archipelagos configuration for the provision of water services (Bakker, 2010), international development cooperation tends to promote projects that address the water infrastructure deficit (Scheumann et al., 2008).

The water infrastructure deficit of cities in the Global South can be traced back to colonial times. The provision of urban water supply and sanitation was secured for the European colonizers and excluded natives from the benefits (Gandy, 2008; Kooy and Bakker, 2008; McFarlane, 2008). This repeated inequitable access to water and sanitation in post-colonial times demonstrates that the greatest challenge for international development cooperation in supporting water infrastructure development is, in fact, water governance. How does a particular project, placed at a given location, emerge as the solution to address a water supply issue? Who decides that this is the best solution? Were other alternatives considered? Who really benefits from the project and who is negatively impacted? The infrastructure configuration of African cities, in which particular groups enjoy regular and easy access to water while others do not, results of the dominance of simplified views and technocratic understandings of governance as an instrument or toolkit that can be replicated in different contexts and as an idealized partnership, in which idealized actors would act driven by a shared sense of responsibility for the well-being of society (Castro, 2007; Cleaver, 1999).

International development cooperation tends to depoliticize water governance by framing it as a purely technoscientific process (Jordan, 2008; Linton, 2010) whereas it is rather a political process that ‘resembles a highly asymmetric and evolving structure where the actors tend to have dissimilar proportions of political power and knowledge’ (Castro, 2007, pp. 106-107). Donor interventions advance new paradigms, such as the Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM), with the purpose of catalysing the transition from state-led and centralised water governance to processes involving multiple stakeholders. However, neglecting the power politics behind water governance, donor interventions fail to empower the urban poor and to address ecological needs, thus also failing to promote the participatory and decentralized decision-making processes in accordance with the IWRM paradigm (Kwon and Kim, 2014).

Therefore, how can international development cooperation promote innovative urban water governance for African cities and address the structural inequalities that dictate access to water supply and sanitation? This paper addresses the question examining the decision-making process behind the Greater Maputo Water Supply Expansion Project (GMWSEP) in Mozambique. The Project promotes the expansion of the state-regulated water
infrastructure and is financed by the World Bank, in partnership with governmental aid agencies from the Netherlands and France. The GMWSEP proposes the implementation of a new system for fresh water supply for Greater Maputo in the Incomati River, one of the three international watercourses — including the Umbeluzi and the Maputo rivers — shared with South Africa and Swaziland.

The GMWSEP system augments the production capacity of water to stabilize urban water supply in the areas already served by the state-regulated water network and to enable the network expansion, in order to increase the coverage level in Greater Maputo, currently between 40 to 46 per cent (FIPAG, 2011; World Bank, 2013). The additional water source would reduce the climate vulnerability of Greater Maputo. The state-regulated water network is supplied by a single intake at the Umbeluzi River and its ability to secure urban water supply is often compromised by the floods and droughts systematically hitting southern Mozambique. The GMWSEP installs an additional intake at the Incomati River, at an existing dam used for irrigation. The Project would also enhance the adaptive capacity of the urban water infrastructure to cope with rising sea levels, as the new water source is located more than one hundred meters above the sea level and further away from the coastline, in comparison to the existing water source (World Bank, 2013).

Mozambique’s low-income status and its strategic geographic position - downstream from nine of the fourteen trans-boundary river basins shared by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) - made the country prone to donor interventions in the water sector since independence from Portugal in 1975. From the end of colonization up until April 2014, the World Bank has lent over USD 2 billion to Mozambique, for development projects. The Bank has also launched neo-liberal reforms, marking the transition from the Marxist-Leninist political system of the newly independent government to a capitalist one (Hall and Young, 1997). Aid dependent, Mozambique welcomed the IWRM principles of decentralization, participation, water pricing and river basin management promoted mainly with French and Dutch donor interventions in the water sector (Inguane et al., 2014; van der Zaag and Carmo Vaz, 2003). The IWRM paradigm was officially adopted in the 1991 Water Law6 and was reinforced with the creation of the Regional Water Management Units7, the approval of the 1998 Delegated Management Framework8 and the 2007 National Water Policy9.

This paper reviews the discourses and practices of the actors involved in the decision-making process related to the GMWSEP. It builds upon the perspective that nirvana concepts (Molle, 2008) — illusory, ideal concepts driving development cooperation - are constraining innovative water governance for African cities. The power politics determining who has access to water — and how — is introduced to analyse the case of improving urban water supply for Greater Maputo. The actors’ discourses are studied to identify the parties powerful enough to steer the outcomes of urban water governance and the ideologies reproduced through these decisions.

The paper analyses what the GMWSEP means for the promotion of innovative water governance and socio-economic changes for African cities. This case study analyses ten project documents and forty-seven semi-structured interviews with eight donors, twenty-one state authorities, seven researchers and eleven water users and/or Small-Scale Informal Providers. The interviews were conducted during field research in Mozambique from November 2013 to February 2014.

NIRVANA CONCEPTS AND THE CHALLENGE OF WATER GOVERNANCE

International development cooperation for water management and infrastructure development has been shaped by nirvana concepts. These are socially constructed concepts structured by narratives and stories that represent simplified understandings of real-life issues (Molle, 2008). The promotion of several nirvana concepts such as the promotion of sustainable development, and modernization and of the IWRM paradigm per se, drives the

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intervention of donors in the Global South. What allows those drivers to water management and infrastructure development to be categorized as nirvana concepts is the difficulty in reaching an agreement on a precise definition for them (Molle, 2008). Nirvana concepts build upon a wide range of goals that seem impossible for a society to achieve. For instance, the goal of the IWRM is to meet the ‘three E’s’ for sustainability and climate change resilience: Equity, Efficiency and Ecology or Environmental protection (Rosenzweig et al., 2011). In reaching these goals, the power politics shaping the decisions about what projects should be pursued, how they should be carried, where, and when, are ignored by the donors, engineers and policy-makers sustaining and disseminating the nirvana concepts driving development initiatives (Molle, 2008; Molle et al., 2009).

Those actors form the epistemic communities validating models for management of water resources. They do so by engaging in water-related international events that set the means and ends for development, such as the UN-led events (Rio + 20, Budapest Water Summit) and the World Water Forums (Conca, 2008; Molle, 2008). In those events, the view that good governance and sustainable development are achieved once the right techniques are correctly applied — for instance, public participation and decentralization, defining the IWRM paradigm — is socially constructed, defended and approved for replication worldwide in different local contexts. Global South countries embrace those models, principles and techniques with the aim of attracting investments from international development cooperation (Cleaver, 1999; Molle, 2008).

The development initiatives promoting participatory and decentralized approaches for the design of projects depoliticize water governance, assuming that the control of such a vital resource should be decided on the basis of equity, cooperation and solidarity. What actually takes place is the opposite: water governance is less an ‘idealized scheme of interaction between also idealized actors’ (Castro, 2007, p. 106) and more a dispute among actors trying to secure their own interests (Cleaver, 1999). Water infrastructure development mirrors the ideologies and the views of the dominant actors driving the outcomes of water governance (Molle et al., 2009; Castro, 2007; Loftus and Lumsden, 2007). Hence, the fragmented distribution of water infrastructure in African cities and their poor resilience to the expected impacts of climate change reflect how the decision-making process has been structured: who has been historically included and excluded, and who best played power politics (Bakker, 2010; Gandy, 2004, 2008; Swyngedouw, 2004). In colonial times, colonisers steered water governance outcomes in the Global South. Vested as donors in post-colonial times, Global North economies remain powerful in advancing their interests, however, they must cope with the increasing dispute of interests with local elites and emerging Global South economies.

The IWRM paradigm tries to address some of these imbalances in international development cooperation. Although it is driving the transition from state-led and authoritarian water governance (government) processes to more deliberative forms of governance involving civil society (Jordan, 2008), the urban poor remain largely excluded from decision-making processes and ecological needs are not significantly addressed in the trade-off with economic growth, even when there have been changes towards greener practices with environmental movements (Bakker, 2010). As evidenced by the archipelago-like configuration of water services and the lack of ecological sustainability in the urbanization of water, the needs for regular, safe and affordable access to water by the most vulnerable are slowly or ineffectively addressed in comparison to the interests of water bureaucrats, state-level and local politicians, water companies and the development banks. The latter would enjoy “synergetic relationships” whereby the ways the flows of water are created or modified by water infrastructure are intertwined with flows of power and influence, often manifested in the form of political or financial benefits’ (Molle et al., 2009: 336). Therefore, the provision of infrastructure in international development cooperation for water governance ends up serving the social and spatial engineering of state control and capitalist production (Scott, 1999), rather than promoting social inclusion and changing the structural inequalities inherited from colonialism and perpetuated in post-colonial times.
IMPROVING URBAN WATER SUPPLY IN GREATER MAPUTO

This paper adopts a politicized view of water governance in order to review the decision-making process initiated when the World Bank recommended the implementation of the GMWSEP in 2007 to address the water infrastructure deficit and increasing demand for water. The GMWSEP was recommended in the World Bank’s Preliminary Economic Analysis of Maputo Bulk Water Source Development (2007). The document reflects the Bank’s assessment of the strategies proposed by the Mozambican water authorities to improve urban water supply in Greater Maputo. The urban population in Maputo City nearly doubled from 1980-2007, jumping from 537,912 to 1,099,019 (Henriques, 2008). This happened both as a result of population growth and rural-urban migration during the 1977-1992 Civil War (Jenkins, 2000; Sidaway, 1993). The process to improve the urban water supply concluded with the World Bank approving, on 27 June 2013, a USD 178 million credit to execute the GMWSEP. Forthcoming, I present the key features of the development of the GMWSEP and the role of the different actors involved: the World Bank, the Mozambican water authorities and the water users of the Incomati River Basin.

The provision of water services in Greater Maputo

During the almost 400 years of Portuguese colonization, the provision of water services in Maputo City catered for the needs of European residents and the assimilated natives (Jenkins, 2000). Water supply was secured by an intake at the Umbeluzi River, historically used by the local Nguni inhabitants to abstract water (Barros et al., 2014). The first significant donor intervention for water infrastructure development came after independence, when the Italian Government financed the construction of two dams in southern Mozambique. Pequenos Libombos (1986) was constructed for irrigation purposes and urban water supply in the Umbeluzi River Basin. Corumana (1989) was constructed for irrigation use in the Incomati River Basin and power generation (Bussotti and De Mutti, 2013).

The exclusion of the native urban population from the provision of water services in the colonial era, adding to the failure of the newly independent Mozambican Government to expand the formal water network, resulted in the rise of Small-Scale Informal Providers (SSIPs). The majority of the urban population in Greater Maputo reside in the suburbs and peri-urban neighbourhoods disconnected from the state-regulated water network (Henriques, 2008). These people rely on urban water supply from the 650-800 SSIPs (Ahlers et al., 2012; FIPAG, 2011). The SSIPs ensure that urban water supply comes from groundwater and allows the resale of surface water from the Umbeluzi River captured from the illegal connections made to the formal water network. They dig wells in the premises where they run their water businesses and install the pumps and storages to serve a clientele numbering from the dozens to the thousands (Matsinhe et al., 2008). The limited industrial development in Mozambique forces the SSIPs to import the water pumps and related equipment. The users pay for the water consumed and are often charged with the implementation cost of the pipeline for household connection. However, these informal water businesses are diverse. Some SSIPs have meters installed in their premises to monitor water use and lay down pipes underneath roads while others sell bulk water or have pipes laid on the surface.

The activities of the SSIPs are poorly monitored, particularly in terms of pricing and water quality. Low investment in the maintenance of the formal water network led to 49 per cent of Unaccounted for Water (UFW) of the overall water production in the state-regulated water infrastructure (World Bank, 2013). The SSIPs operating closer to the coastline are digging their wells deeper to secure their production capacity and prevent saltwater intrusion. The formal water system operating at the Umbeluzi River is vulnerable to floods in the rainy season and to saltwater intrusion under droughts (World Bank, 2013). As far as sanitation is concerned, it is estimated that ‘three quarters

10 Interview 8 (2013).
11 Interviews 7 and 9 (2013).
12 Interviews 7, 9 and 10 (2013).
of the wastewater produced in Greater Maputo goes back to the environment without treatment and 70 per cent of sanitation goes back through latrines.\textsuperscript{13}

The Greater Maputo Water Supply Expansion Project

The GMWSEP proposes to divert surface water from the Corumana Dam, in the Incomati River, to augment the production capacity of raw water for urban water supply in the state-regulated water network. The project includes the construction of a water treatment plant in the district of Sabiê, near the Corumana Dam, and of a pipeline to transport water to Greater Maputo (see Figure 1). The new water system will secure 24/7 water supply in the served project area and enable the expansion of the formal water network to the not served project area.

Figure 1. Greater Maputo Water Supply Expansion Project

13 Interview 10 (2013).
The timeframe for the implementation of the Project is 2017\textsuperscript{14}. The total costs are estimated at USD 266.5 million and € 60 million. This includes:

- The USD 48.5 million credit from the World Bank for the rehabilitation of the Corumana Dam for domestic water use\textsuperscript{15} - it was originally built for irrigation and power generation;
- The USD 178 million loan from the World Bank for the execution of Phase I of the GMWSEP, with the abstraction of 60,000 m\textsuperscript{3} of raw water a day;
- The estimated USD 40 million additional costs to increase the raw water abstraction to 120,000 m\textsuperscript{3}/day\textsuperscript{16};
- The € 23 million and € 40 million provided by the governments of the Netherlands and France respectively to cover part of the network expansion in the not yet served project area (see Figure 1).

The decision-making process for improving urban water supply in Greater Maputo

The approval of the GMWSEP involved the World Bank, the French/Dutch donors, the Mozambican water authorities, and water users of the Incomati River Basin where the additional water source for Greater Maputo will be located. The World Bank led the process based on technical studies that demonstrated the feasibility of the GMWSEP (World Bank, 2007). The cost-benefit analysis performed by the World Bank supported its denial to finance the construction of the Moamba Major Dam, the infrastructure initially proposed by the Mozambican water authorities to secure water supply in Greater Maputo. The Dam plan was outlined in the *National Water Resources Management Strategy* (DNA, 2004) commissioned by the World Bank for the Government of Mozambique. The World Bank (2013) frames the GMWSEP as\textsuperscript{17}:

1. Contributing to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Mozambique and the World Bank’s Strategy for Africa regarding the time women spend to fetch water;
2. Addressing the infrastructure deficit affecting private-sector competitiveness and the health and welfare of the urban population;
3. Improving the control of water access related to the SSIPs’ exploitation of groundwater;
4. Increasing resilience to climate change scenarios.

Private companies from the Netherlands and France are in charge of the research and infrastructure works to implement the Project’s backbone. The French contribute to the rehabilitation of the existing formal water network, following investments to improve the water treatment plant at the Umbeluzi River\textsuperscript{18}. The Dutch Royal Haskoning and Vitens Evidens International consult for the Mozambican water authorities for water management, infrastructure development and systems’ maintenance\textsuperscript{19}. From the € 23 million donated by the Government of the Netherlands, over € 2 million have been allocated so far to Royal Haskoning and Vitens Evidens International. The companies conduct the technical studies for the network expansion in the not yet served project area\textsuperscript{20}. In addition

\textsuperscript{14} Interview 40 (2014).
\textsuperscript{15} World Bank (2011) Project appraisal document on a proposed credit in the amount of SDR 43.8 million to the Republic of Mozambique for the Water Resources Development Project. The World Bank: AFTWR.
\textsuperscript{16} Interview 18 (2013).
\textsuperscript{17} Interviews 10 and 18 (2013).
\textsuperscript{18} Interview 34 (2013).
\textsuperscript{19} Interview 38 (2014).
\textsuperscript{20} The Mozambican authorities argue that the same service could be contracted for much less though (Interview 38, 2014).
to the GMWSEP, the Dutch Embassy in Maputo is supporting reforms to the leading policy-making body regulating the water sector in Mozambique.\(^{21}\)

The Mozambican water authorities involved in the approval of the GMWSEP were the National Directorate of Water (DNA), the Water Supply Investment and Asset Fund (FIPAG) and the Regional Water Management Unit - South (ARA-SUL). DNA leads the policy-making process and is in charge of rehabilitating the Corumana Dam. ARA-SUL is in charge of water resource management at the river basin level. It was created in 1993 to administer the Corumana and Pequenos Libombos dams. FIPAG owns the network for urban water supply in Maputo City and has controlled public investment in the water systems since 1998 when it was established through the Delegated Management Framework. The Fund owns 73 per cent of the shares of the Portuguese company Águas da Região de Maputo that holds the concession contract to operate the urban water supply system in Greater Maputo. It is the recipient of the funds donated by the governments of the Netherlands and France, in addition to the USD 178 million credit from the World Bank to execute the GMWSEP. A body of engineers trained in water management and infrastructure development in educational centres in the Global North make-up the Mozambican water authorities.

The World Bank's refusal to finance the Moamba Major Dam in 2007 intensified the commercial relations between Brazil and Mozambique. This relationship reached its peak when the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) agreed to finance USD 352 million (75%) of the estimated total of USD 466 million for the construction of Moamba Major Dam, with a USD 114 million (15%) contribution from the Government of Mozambique. In December 2013, ARA-SUL signed a contract with the Brazilian infrastructure conglomerate Andrade Gutierrez to construct the Moamba Major Dam. The Dam is central to the Mozambican water authorities’ aim to deal with the resistance from the irrigation users in the Incomati River Basin to allow for the approval of the GMWSEP. Additionally, the Corumana Dam, the new water source, was built for irrigation, and the water diversion for urban water supply disturbs the expansion plans of the sugar factories Xinavane and Maragra, which represent more than 90\% of irrigation use in the Incomati River Basin (DNA, 2012). From the 34,000 ha watered by the Corumana Dam, over half (23,000 ha) is used by Xinavane (17,000 ha) and Maragra (6,000 ha). The sugar factories fear the GMWSEP will threaten their economic growth.

“What worries us is that, obviously, we are trapped. We cannot grow. And of course, for a corporation like ours, there is always the interest of growing. However, it is clear that growth in this side is going to be very difficult unless a new infrastructure emerges.”\(^{23}\)

Although the sugar factories did not discuss the GMWSEP directly with the World Bank and the donor community, they maintained a close relationship with ARA-SUL\(^ {24}\) to follow the Project’s approval. In charge of executing the GMWSEP, FIPAG now becomes a significant water user in the Incomati River. The Fund represents the urban water supply user in Greater Maputo. In the decision-making process, FIPAG held public meetings and informative sessions with the water users of the Incomati River Basin to introduce the new system\(^ {25}\).

However, the SSIPs were not involved in the decision-making process for the GMWSEP. Following the World Bank’s public announcement of the Project in July 2013, the SSIPs cut water supply off for twenty-four hours, impacting nearly 60\% of the inhabitants in Greater Maputo who are disconnected from the state-regulated water network. AFORAMO — one of the two SSIPs’ associations — publicly contested their exclusion from the decision-making process and the government’s refusal to compensate the SSIPs impacted by the expansion of the formal

\(^{21}\) Interview 41 (2014).
\(^{22}\) This number may be higher. Data shared by APAMO, the Association of Sugar Producers in Mozambique, shows that 17,169 ha are currently irrigated by Xinavane and 9,038 ha by Maragra. The total area would be 26,207 ha.
\(^{23}\) Interview 47 (2014).
\(^{24}\) Interview 43 (2014).
\(^{25}\) Interview 38 (2014).
network (Macanandze, 12 July 2013). According to the World Bank’s assessment, dealing with the SSIP is like ‘walking on a minefield’, considering they currently cover 40 to 50 per cent of the state-regulated water network.26

TURNING CHALLENGES INTO OPPORTUNITIES IN URBAN WATER GOVERNANCE

This case study reveals that post-colonial development interventions for the provision of water services in the Global South are shaped by a nirvana concept deeply rooted in urban water governance: the modern infrastructure ideal. Projects for water infrastructure development are based on securing universal access to state-regulated water networks. Thus, donor attempts to address the infrastructure deficit usually ignore the reality of informal water services through the provision of urban water supply by the SSIPs.

This view that water must be provided for all through standard services puts African cities in a position where they seem to be constantly lagging ‘behind’ the Global North’s cities in terms of urban water infrastructure. It creates this idea that African cities are suffering from an infrastructure deficit. Therefore, intense urbanization in Africa and in the Global South’s cities turns this modern infrastructure ideal into a concept that is probably impossible to implement. Additionally, the wide range of goals (number of household connections, hours of water supply, meters of pipeline) motivating efforts to promote water infrastructure projects makes this process even more difficult given the current pace of urbanization and considering the financial and political reality of African cities. The parameters of the ‘modern’ itself cannot be precisely defined. This makes it unclear what exactly is expected from African cities in terms of performance in the provision of urban water infrastructure. In face of the threat of climate change, the modern infrastructure ideal is adapted to meet the discourses of increasing cities’ resilience. Donors’ interventions end up promoting the expansion of water infrastructure under centralized management with the purpose of ensuring the adaptive capacity of cities.

The modern infrastructure ideal blinds international development cooperation and African policy-makers’ ability to address effectively the structural inequalities in the water sector. This blindness also prevents them from thinking about alternatives that could better promote social and economic development in African cities. In the case of Mozambique, nearly one thousand SSIPs in Greater Maputo have been excluded from the decision-making process for improving urban water governance while the group is an important stakeholder in the Project. This exclusion is the result of the centralization practices advocated by the same donors and governments that adopted — at least discursively — the IWRM paradigm for water management and infrastructure development. The IWRM principles of decentralization and public participation were reduced to public hearings and informative sessions about the GMWSEP.

Firstly the donors, and secondly, the Mozambican Water Authorities steered the decision-making process leading to the observed outcomes in water governance. They legitimized their views of how water should be governed through the approval of the GMWSEP. The promotion of social entrepreneurship and capacity building for (urban water) governance should be advanced in international development cooperation. It should recognize that innovations — which might look traditional at times — are taking place on the ground to effectively address the structural inequalities in African cities. In the case of urban water supply for Greater Maputo, if urban water governance were a participatory process, the SSIPs would have been invited to discuss how to improve urban water supply. The GMWSEP not only hampers the economic activities of the SSIPs, but it also compromises the opportunities for income generation by the employees maintaining the water systems operations (through billing, the implementation of household connections and pipeline maintenance). The micro-economy generated through the water businesses is about to be annihilated.

Instead of pushing for a modern infrastructure ideal, donor intervention could provide business training and credit for low-income families and/or micro-entrepreneurs to start their own water businesses supplied by treated surface water at subsidized prices. This could stimulate the reduction of untreated groundwater, the consumption of which

26 Interview 10 (2013).
is associated with many risks. There could also be financial support and capacity building for the development of cooperatives and commercial associations for the development and commercialization of the machinery required to maintain the water systems as operational. Hence, the local, regional and national economy would be strengthened instead of the import relations sustained by the limited industrial development in Mozambique.

International development cooperation could also foster South-South and tripartite cooperation to invest in capacity building for (urban water) governance. The shared history between Global South countries and the similarities in water infrastructure distribution would facilitate trust building in the design of water infrastructure projects and give room to the rise of development initiatives designed to adequately address the urban water needs in African cities. As civic education and democratic values are poorly promoted in the Global South countries in general, local workshops, training and awareness raising activities would enforce legislation that regulates the provision of water services and clarifies the means and ends for the involvement of civil society.

CONCLUSION

We cannot expect newly independent countries to adopt and perform democratic values as well as a system of participatory water governance that empowers actors historically excluded from decision-making processes, simply through legislative reforms. The shift from authoritarian to democratic governance requires changes in the preconceived perceptions of how water resources should be governed and for what purpose. This paper argues that, in failing to implement participatory and decentralized water governance, international development cooperation advances a water management and infrastructure agenda based on a history of universal and standard water services from the Global North cities. Worldwide, we see the dissemination and the normalization of the discourses supporting the modern infrastructure ideal as the ‘proper’ development of water service provision networks. This happens through the international training offered by Global North organizations to the professionals in the Global South, the international seminars and events attended, and through donor interventions tailored for low-income countries. As the history of universal services is not shared by Global South cities, the notion of infrastructure deficit is based on the negligence of existing informal infrastructure that secures water access to natives disconnected from the formal network for urban water services.

Donor interventions seek to replicate and validate the governance values advanced in international development cooperation and the sustainable and modern solutions for water management and infrastructure, even if those solutions do not target the structural inequalities in the Global South. Behind this pressure on African cities to reach this modernist ideal is the vested interest of private companies. Their ties with their governments helps them in securing contracts and, in turn, those private companies contribute to the sustainability of the country’s economy under crisis due to the stagnation of the Global North economies. In the case of Maputo, the GMWSEP concentrates the provision of urban water in the hands of the state-regulated water utility instead of investing in the use and improvement of the existing informal water infrastructure, which has been supplying Greater Maputo inhabitants over decades of exclusion. The recognition of the role of informal infrastructure in securing the provision of water services in African cities represents the first step in turning the challenge of creating sustainable practices for urban water supply into long lasting social and economic change.

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The New Frontier of Governance in Africa

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Abstract:
This article examines Africa’s good governance agenda since the early 1990s, tracing the emergence of the ideas of democracy and self-governance in the region. As a point of departure, the paper argues that self-governance as practised in Africa today is disconnected from the everyday challenges of the masses. The paper uses a social perspective approach to provide insight about self-governance in Africa. Centrally, it argues that in light of social, economic and political issues, the purpose of governance should be reframed in terms of service delivery. To achieve this, actors within the governance process, both in and outside government, must see their function primarily as rendering services to the citizens with whom they have a social pact. The paper acknowledges globalisation as the most important challenge that governments will have to grapple with in delivering much-needed development on the continent. Nevertheless, leadership in all spheres of society remains critical for improving self-governance for development.

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INTRODUCTION
What is the nature of self-governance in Africa today? How has governance responded to the needs of the masses on the continent, especially within the broader context of democratisation? What ideas about self-governance on the continent are emerging, and what dilemmas are associated with it? These are some of the questions this paper seeks to address. However, before this can be achieved, it is necessary to clarify a few concepts that the paper will grapple with. Firstly, consider the term ‘democracy’. Schumpeter (1947) defines democracy as the administration of elections: the process through which a community chooses its political leaders and entrusts them with the responsibility to help society achieve its shared goals. In a more liberal and basic sense of the term, democracy is the free exercise of one’s fundamental rights — of thought, expression, association, movement etc. Thus, ‘democracy means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them’ (Schumpeter, 1947, p. 270). The transition to a society in which the exercise of one’s fundamental rights is possible is known as democratisation. Democratisation is thus a complex mechanism via which society organises itself politically, socially and economically to achieve a common good through elected or appointed representatives; the organisation of pluralistic institutional structures for creating a modern liberal state (World Bank, 1989; 2000).

Linked to the idea of democratisation is the concept of governance, which is concerned with patterns of rule in a society. According to Leftwitch (1996), the concept of good governance can be understood in two ways. The first is that good governance ‘consists of a set of rules and institutions (a legal framework for development) and a system of public administration which is open, transparent, efficient and accountable’ (p. 15). Such a system provides a favourable environment for the private sector to play a leading role in the development of a state. However, this component of Leftwitch’s definition is narrow and limited to administrative or managerial processes. The second way to conceptualise the notion of good governance is to equate it to democratic governance. This meaning is much broader than the technical definition, combining technical ‘efficiency’ and democratic politics. In this view, the essential ingredients of a state where good governance is at play include: ‘competitive party systems, regular free and fair elections, an independent judiciary, a free press and the protection of human rights’ (Leftwitch, 1996, p. 16).

As it is elsewhere in the world, the question of what democratisation is, is a contested issue in Africa (See Shivji, 1990; Ake, 1993 and 2000; Gyimah-Boadi, 2007; Abrahamsen, 2000). Africa has, in recent years, experienced a new wave of democratisation. In much of Sub-Saharan Africa, there was a rebirth of democracy marked by a popular sense of optimism, in what Ake (1996) has described as a ‘second wave’ of independence. This promised not only to end despotic rule, but also to alter the organisation of social, economic and political activities away from something reserved for the privileged petty bourgeoisie (Ake, 2000). This revival was necessitated by the dashed hopes of the masses following early post-independence governments and the Lost Decade of development of the 1980s (Adedeji, 1994; Sandbrook, 2000). The first wave of independence between the 1950s and the 1960s had, in fact, promised to expand production, allocate and distribute resources, and build social and economic infrastructure for a transformed society. However, this could not be achieved due to a number of factors that bedevilled the state in Africa (Sandbrook, 2000, pp. 1-25).28

The new democratic wave was further shaped by the dramatic collapse of many Eastern European dictatorships (Jonah, 1998). Democratisation, in its conventional and formal usage, connotes political liberties, such as freedoms of movement, association, and expression; granting of universal adult suffrage; rule of law and respect for human rights; accountability of public office holders; the institutionalisation of ‘formal’ institutions that directly or indirectly work to promote democratic competition and shape governance and the internalisation of rules governing the exercise of power and power relations, among others (see Sandbrook, 2000, pp. 4-5). In sum, the democracy - good governance discourse argues that applying civil liberties to spheres of politics and the market will create the

28 Some of the factors that confounded the state included the lack of adequate institutional orientation towards development after independence, the attitude of state elites or public office holders, coercive state apparatus and rent-seeking politics among others (also see Meredith, 2005).
necessary conditions for development and prosperity (Williams and Young, 1994; Sandbrook, 2000). It is within this context that the current state of self-governance in Africa and the innovations that have accompanied it must be understood. Moreover, the development failures observed within the African continent during the 1980s, coupled with the poor achievements chalked under Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP), further pushed the good governance agenda on the continent. During this period, most Sub-Saharan African countries implemented economic recovery policies recommended by the Bretton Woods institutions in the hope of boosting their economies. However, very little success was achieved in most cases, bringing to the fore various factors that accounted for the economies’ poor performance in spite of the huge capital injection from the donor institutions.29

This essay will begin by arguing that Africa’s current self-governance has not yielded the desired results. At best, it has only widened the space for élite recruitment into partisan politics, with periodic elections serving as a platform to alternate political power between competing élite groupings. These conditions are deemed to still be present. The aspirations of the masses that propelled the pro-democracy movement have been dashed with the seeming inability of governments to create prudent solutions to the many challenges facing the continent. Secondly, it will argue that self-governance in Africa has been used as a means to legitimise the market system and to integrate African economies into global capitalist dynamics to further Western hegemony. Centrally, due to current social, economic and political events in Africa, governance practices on the continent should be reframed in terms of service delivery. The actors in the governance process must see their function primarily as delivering services to a third party with whom they have a pact. This argument stems from widely held critical views about governance in Africa and reflects the disillusionment expressed across many platforms. Moreover, the practice of self-governance as viewed from the service-delivery perspective will be more aligned to the needs of the masses on the continent. By recognising the challenges for governance in Africa posed by globalisation, economic pressures and internal and external social factors, the paper will briefly explore the principal dilemmas being faced. Thus, the article will proceed as follows: the first section will outline the analytical and conceptual frameworks of self-governance, looking at how the term has been applied to the region. The second section will discuss the main arguments surrounding the democratisation process in Africa after two decades, with regards to the prospects and expectations of African citizens. The third section will continue by analysing emerging dimensions of the concept of self-governance in Africa from the perspective of citizens and with regards to the teething challenges facing the continent’s development agenda. In this section, it will be argued that for Africa’s self-governance agenda to meet the continent’s developmental needs, governance must be conceptualised and practiced as service delivery in a constantly evolving setting.

The fourth section will then examine some contested issues. The modern state is established on the ideals of a social pact as propounded by Hobbes (see Goodin and Tilly, 2008). Here, individuals give up their right to self-determination to the state (the sovereign) in exchange for the provision of their social, economic and political needs. These rights are foregone with the assurance that the state will reciprocate by creating an enabling environment for citizens to realise their potentials. Self-governance in Africa has, thus far, not yet met popular aspirations. The swaths of people struggling to meet their everyday needs in very harsh conditions want to see their elected and appointed servants working to help them find sustainable solutions. This, to them, is the desired outcome of self-governance. Finally, the concluding section will link the major arguments of the paper and end by noting that there is the need for a radical shift in the practice of self-governance in Africa. While globalisation presents important challenges that African governments will have to address in realising the goals of the continents’ second independence, leadership at all levels, especially from political, social and economic elites, will be key to achieving this long-awaited development.

29 Examples of some of the factors that hindered the successful implementation of Structural Adjustment Programs in Africa include; the lack of institutional capacity to carry out the adjustment reforms; lack of equipment and medication in government health facilities, the political cost of implementing adjustment policies, the roles and limits of states and markets in promoting growth and the allocation of transitional costs among others (see Nelson, 1990).
**SELF-GOVERNANCE: WHAT’S IN A NAME?**

The word ‘governance’ is ubiquitous and is used as a catch-all phrase for a broad range of challenges faced by governments. The term has become almost an obsession in current debates about development (Williams and Young, 1994). Bretton Woods institutions and donor agencies commonly render assistance to developing countries conditional on ‘good governance’ (Williams and Young, 1994). Changes in climatic conditions, extinction of wildlife and forest species and the outbreak of the Ebola pandemic in the Mano river area are all considered as issues relating to or stemming from governance failures. Acts of fundamentalism and insurgency by the Islamic State militants (IS), Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab in Syria, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia and Kenya respectively are all considered to relate to governance issues, as are the worsening electricity crisis in countries as diverse as Ghana and South Africa. Likewise, the worsening economic situations in Malawi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Niger and Burkina Faso are pinned to governance, as are human rights violations in Gambia, Saudi Arabia and China. Furthermore, the concept of ‘governance’ is a central component of numerous academic disciplines, including development studies, security studies, economics, geography, international relations, planning, political science, public administration and sociology (Bevir, 2010). Each discipline uses the concept in a different and disconnected way. At the most general level, governance refers to theories and issues of social coordination and the nature of all patterns of rule.

More specifically, governance refers to various new theories and practices of governing and the dilemmas to which they give rise (Bevir, 2010). Governance in all these different guises contrasts with older conceptions of the state as a monolithic and formal entity (Bevir, 2010). Several theories of governance, including policy network theory, rational choice theory and interpretive theory have all challenged abstract concepts of the state as a monolithic entity, interest or actor (Bevir, 2010). Instead, these theories have highlighted the processes and interactions through which diverse social interests and actors combine to produce the policies, practices and effects that define patterns of governing. Former British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, defines governance as ‘embodying pluralism, public accountability, respect for the rule of law and human rights, and market principles’ (cited in Williams and Young, 1994, p. 85). According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), governance is:

> [A] system of values, policies and institutions by which a society manages its economic, political and social affairs through interactions within and among the state, civil society and private sector. It is the way a society organises itself to make and implement decisions - achieving mutual understanding, agreement and action. It comprises the mechanisms and processes for citizens and groups to articulate their interests, mediate their differences and exercise their legal rights and obligations. It is the rules, institutions and practices that set limits and provide incentives for individuals, organisations and firms. Governance, including its social, political and economic dimensions, operates at every level of human enterprise, be it the household, village, municipality, nation, region or globe (UNDP, 2000 cited in UNDP, 2009, p. 7)

According to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), governance is the state's capacity to ‘develop an efficient and effective public management process . . . . [and] to deliver basic services’ (USAID, 1998 as cited in Goldsmith, 2003, p. 27). For Kohler-Koch and Jachtenfuchs, governance is ‘the continuous political process of setting explicit goals for society and intervening in it in order to achieve these goals’ (Kohler-Koch and Jachtenfuchs, 2004, p. 99).

These diverse definitions emphasise four critical issues: first, that local society is the starting point for governance, even within the global context. Secondly, governance is seen as involving local and international actors from within and outside the public sphere, merging the state-society divide. Thirdly, governance is seen as relating to polity, politics and policy. Finally, governance is seen as a process of setting and attaining goals by society. This places primacy on the individual in a governance process held together by a social pact that is constantly being redefined to suit changing needs. This final emphasis is germane to Africa’s current experiences of self-governance. By affixing ‘self’ to governance at the level of society, the term is understood to signify the process through which a
society articulates its goals and mediates differences through a set of collectively agreed upon institutions and procedures.

The self-governance movement that swept across Africa in the 1990s allowed societies to adopt institutions that would mediate their affairs and enable them to achieve prosperity. This was understood as a second independence that would liberate and unleash political, social and economic advancement for the people. The pro-democracy movement drew on the energy of the masses, whose hopes and aspirations had been dashed just a decade after independence, and, in some cases, had been worsened by authoritarian regimes (Ake, 1996). Two decades on and the same questions are being asked on the streets of Accra, Cairo, Lagos, Lusaka, Nairobi, Ouagadougou and Tunis. The popular slogans – that democracy was going to bring about development and ‘good governance’, ‘sanitising’ the state and ultimately leading to prosperity – seem to have dissipated. This, however, does not negate the fact that there has been some modest progress in African governance practices. At the procedural level, there has been a rise in the working of the rule of law, the granting of civil liberties, the affirmation and application of human rights and some modest gains in the levels of accountability and transparency.

The ideas of self-governance and citizenship are strongly linked to social concepts that promise the prospect of change. Citizenship can be understood as the notion of being a legitimate member of a society, whose duty is to protect the integrity of the state, and to ensure its sustainability for progressive development. On the other hand, self-governance is the practice of setting and attaining the mutual goals of society through a process accepted as legitimate by all actors involved. This process is not static: it is fluid and involves the constant redefinition of goals. Governance thus becomes an all-encompassing activity involving every member of society capable and willing to participate. With regard to the underrepresented, such as children, the sick and the aged, who lack the capacity to participate in the governance process, the majority have a duty to ensure that the interests of these groups are served. These concepts imply two main requirements, duty and reward, both of which are lacking in the African context. There is a need for a radical shift in the approach of actors in the governance process to make the current practice of self-governance benefit the masses and fulfil their desperate needs. This shift in thinking should stem from the idea that each actor in the governance process is a provider and consumer of services provided by another.

Africa’s self-governance must be reconceptualised in the framework of service delivery by actors at all levels. It must be seen as an open-ended process in which various actors are delivering services and collecting feedback. The feedback process helps in evaluating one’s performance for improvement. The actors are both providers and consumers of a service, depending on their position at any given time within the process. For instance, the Interior Minister of a country provides services to the people by offering policy directions and providing administrative oversight. In doing this, she receives feedback from personnel in the field. Yet, she is at another time a consumer of services: for example, the security and protection delivered by police to the public. In light of the benefits and services that he or she will receive, each actor in the governance process makes an implicit pact to behave respectfully and dutifully toward others and his or her community.

However, it is important to note that the delivery of services in the public sector is not synonymous with profit-oriented service delivery in the private sector. For instance, the provision of public goods, such as public health insurance schemes by governmental agencies, as opposed to privately administered schemes, will not require the same operations process, although both arrangements are providing services (see Grint, 2010). Public provision addresses social defects by offering goods or services to a whole range of people with different needs. It is required of such a service to abide by the tenets of the social pact in addressing these needs fairly. Unlike public providers, private ones either offer tailor-made services to sections of the population or generic ones, allowing individuals to decide whether or not they are interested in signing up. This is a profit-motivated strategy, rather than one simply seeking to satisfy a social need.
SELF-GOVERNANCE AND THE DEMOCRATISATION AGENDA IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: TWO AND A HALF DECADES OF DISAPPOINTMENT

The early 1990s witnessed both the re-birth of democratisation through multi-party elections and the emergence of the so-called ‘Good Governance Agenda’ (Adejumobi, 2000). This transition was facilitated by both domestic and external forces. In particular, economic contractions at the domestic level, coupled with the overthrow of Eastern European tyrants in 1989, encouraged the spread of democratic movements in the Global South, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (Sandbrook, 2000). More than half of the continent’s forty-seven countries staged a total of fifty-four elections between 1989 and 1994 (Sandbrook, 2000). These transitional elections saw high voter turnouts, at approximately sixty per cent, and were largely considered free and fair by domestic and foreign election observers (Sandbrook, 2000). A total of fourteen regime changes occurred as a result of these elections (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997; Bratton, 1998, pp. 54-55). This set into motion the current practice of self-governance on the continent, within the democratisation and good governance discourse.

The past two and a half decades have seen Africa gradually shed the label of the ‘ungovernable’ continent, leading to the current ‘Africa rising’ discourse (see Shaw and Mackinnon, 2013). Never had Africa’s self-governance agenda been of more importance than at the beginning of the 1990s, following the influential report by the World Bank (henceforth ‘the Bank’) titled Sub-Saharan Africa: from Crisis to Sustainable Growth, also known as the ‘Berg Report’ (World Bank, 1989). The findings of this commissioned work concluded that the malignant nature of the economies of African states was a ‘tragedy of growth’ (World Bank, 1989). The report further proclaimed that, above all, the litany of crises bedevilling the continent were part of a ‘crisis of governance’, seen as explaining Africa’s economic troubles in the 1970s and 1980s (World Bank, 1989, p. 60).

Following the Lost Decade, African states had to contend with low levels of economic development, poverty and illiteracy, coupled with moribund or modest economic growth. To surmount the crisis facing the continent, the Bank proposed, as a form of policy recommendation, that improving governance was of crucial importance in stimulating the development agenda (Hyden, 1992). According to this line of thinking, there was the need to revamp ailing economies by creating a pluralistic state with accompanying institutional structures that would lead to a renewed political system conducive for private investment. ‘History suggests’, the report argued, that ‘political legitimacy and consensus are a prerequisite for sustainable economic growth and development’ (World Bank, 1989, pp. 60-61). To buttress its conviction, the Bank cited Botswana and Mauritius, both ‘effective parliamentary democracies’, as the two countries with the best performing economies in Africa (Williams and Young, 1994; World Bank, 1989, p. 61).

The Bank’s ‘new’ focus on governance dealt more explicitly with political concerns of legitimacy, participation, pluralism, a free press and human rights as the cardinals for renewing hope and jettisoning lost aspirations (Williams and Young, 1994). As has been acknowledged by much academic literature on the subject, this marked the watershed on the governance discourse on the continent. Neoliberalism as an economic and political ideology became the new order in imagining governance and development in the Global South. The focus on governance has been employed to justify the transition towards the free market era on the continent through the formulation of ‘adjustment policies’ aimed at eliminating or correcting debilitating economic and governance issues in Africa (Williams and Young, 1994).

The Bank’s interest reflected the broader context in which much of the debate on governance and democratisation took place in the late 1980s. The position of the Bank on governance coincided with the democratic wave of the 1990s (Adedeji, 1994). Economic crisis in the 1980s, stemming from global economic shocks, mismanagement by African governments, natural factors including low-levels of rainfall and drought, and biting macroeconomic stabilisation and liberalisation programmes promoted by the Bretton Woods institutions, heaped enormous burdens on the urban working and middle classes, and ultimately discredited authoritarian governments (Sandbrook, 2000, pp. 3-5). This led to the fall of many autocratic regimes, especially as ‘their sustaining patronage resource base had diminished’ (Williams and Young, 1994).
Good governance is a consequence of liberal democratisation. Proponents of the democracy-good governance philosophy in Africa have argued that its self-governance is based on the tenets of liberal democratic politics. According to this school of thought, constitutionalism and respect of human rights, a pluralistic society, accountability of institutions and persons, among others, are cardinal elements to ensuring the emergence of a well-governed and democratic state (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Frempong, 2007).

The creation of liberal institutions was deemed crucial to address the predicaments of the continent through public and market reform. To this end, the public sector was seen as the appropriate sphere for setting the stage for much-needed development. Proponents of the good governance approach argued that this would allow governments to implement workable reform programmes and policies, legitimise market-led development by raising popular support and create the necessary conditions to boost foreign direct investment in critical sectors of the economy (Sandbrook, 2000). These reforms were aimed at fostering accountability of public officials and rendering the decision-making process more transparent, thereby entrusting confidence in the public sector for private capital to boost investment. International institutions further argued that constitutionalism would reduce neo-patrimonial politics, especially within the civil service, replacing corrupt practices with professionalism and probity. Yet, two decades on, the promises of the good governance agenda, which also led towards further ‘integration’ of African states into the global neo-liberal system, are yet to fully materialise (Abrahamsen, 2000; Shivji, 1990).

According to Shivji, the re-introduction of multiparty democracy has, at best, operated as a platform to widen the recruitment of political elites, while the vast inequities and the old practices of cronyism and patronage have remained (Shivji, 1990). Writing almost two decades later, Bob-Milliar (2011) argued that the politically active join political parties ‘because of the selective incentives the parties dispense to their members and not necessarily because of the programmes political parties seek to pursue’ (p. 2). According to Shivji, Western-driven democratisation seeks to reassert capitalist hegemony and encourage market-based development by co-opting authoritarian rulers (Shivji, 1990). In Robinson’s view (1996), Western-style liberal democracy in Africa only furthers ‘low-intensity democracy’, or consensual democracy which serves simply to advance free market economic ideals, thus alienating the masses from a more radical form of democratisation that would re-organise the social and economic spheres of the state for needed transformation and development (Robinson, 1996, pp. 4-6).

Adding to the critique of the debate on democratisation, Saul (1997) has argued that democratisation in the developing world rests on a very ‘narrow’ definition, which originates in polyarchy and reduces democracy to a procedural exercise. Here, it is reduced to periodic competitive elections where organised groups vie for the popular vote, as demanded by civil liberties enshrined in constitutions (Saul, 1997, p. 340). This view is in sync with Ake’s (1996) argument that democracy has been restricted to the political sphere and involves the replacement of one group of elites with another, both of the same stock, whose desire is to promote their sectional interest (Ake, 1996, author’s emphasis). For Ake, liberal democracy will be relevant to Africans only if it is ‘…recreated in the context of the given realities and political arrangements which fit the cultural context in Africa’ (Ake, 1993, p. 240). These arguments imply that the type of self-governance needed in the continent is a form of ‘popular democracy’ based on democratic empowerment of the public, as well as on the cultural values of African society. This would be achieved by expanding the political space for popular participation in a way that allows diffusion of political power throughout society and that can be used to alter unjust social and economic structures for a more progressive society.

During the 1990s, democratising movements based on neo-liberal principles spread throughout Africa. The celebrated national conference held in Benin in the early years of the decade to gauge citizens’ ideas on a new political order, as well as the many public fora organised by pro-democracy movements in countries such as Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia, had a common theme of change for the common good (See Ake, 2000; Adedeji, 1994). For instance, in Ghana the campaign to overthrow the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) and create a democratic constitutional order was argued to be a way for all able and willing citizens to achieve their potentials in a progressive society (Jonah, 1998; Boafo-Arthur, 1999). Thus, the 1990s marked a radical change in state-society relations in a manner that was seen as serving the common good for all. The ‘second wave’ of
independence in Africa in the 1990s, underpinned by neo liberal tenets, promised not only an end to despotic rule but the reform of social, economic and political activities away from the preserve of a few privileged bourgeois (Ake, 1981). It was seen as heralding the revival of popular hopes, held in the 1950s and 1960s during the first wave of independence, that were crushed by the Lost Decade of the early 1980s (Ake, 1993). Despite the similarity of aspirations between the decades, Ake argues that:

The differences in the second wave of democratisation are highly significant. Instead of the collective, it focuses on the individual whose claims are ultimately placed above those of the group. It replaces government by the people with government based on the consent of the people. Instead of the sovereignty of the people, it offers the sovereignty of ‘law’ and operates by repudiating the very idea of popular power making it inimical to people having effective decision-making power (Ake, 2000, p. 10; 1996a, p. 130).

The neo-liberal policy reforms of the era have not put an end to the ills they sought to correct nor delivered the solutions promised by advocates. Sustainable high growth is yet to be achieved, a more coherent production system that effectively and efficiently utilises the abundant resources on the continent and rewards its population has not yet been established and little social progress has occurred. On the contrary, issues of underemployment, poverty and violent conflict, among others, have aggressively increased, further deepening the inequalities engendered by the Lost Decade.

The New Frontier of Self-Governance in Africa: Governance as Service Delivery

Over the past 25 years, actors in the governance process in Africa have been critical of public policy and have increased their demands for service delivery. The populations on the continent do appreciate the tenets that underpin self-governance: the rule of law and respect for human rights and constitutionalism. However, they equally expect government to do more in meeting their general livelihood needs. An interviewee retorted ‘… [but] for how long should we wait to feel the impact of the so-called good governance in our lives?’ when answering a question about his view of the state of governance in Zambia (Interview with Mulenga, 14 December 2014).

Similarly, in a new report on NTV, a frightened resident in Maiduguri asked whether ‘the Nigerian government, in the name of rule of law and human rights, will wait until after all residents are killed before it moves to crush the Boko Haram insurgency’ (NTV News, August 2014). Residents also expressed frustration at the seeming lack of action from an increasingly ambivalent Nigerian government in response to the environmental contamination and depletion of livelihoods by multinational oil companies in the Niger Delta region.

In the Mano River countries (Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea), residents are angry about their respective governments’ handling of the raging Ebola pandemic. Likewise, citizens of Kenya wonder why their government cannot institute prudent policy measures to create a safe and secure nation and defeat the Al-Shabaab insurgency. The disgust is also expressed by residents in mining communities in rural Ghana, concerned about the environmental damage caused by illegal mining by foreign companies, with little response from state institutions; while in urban areas, citizens complain about erratic water and electricity supplies and the poor service provision from government and quasi-governmental institutions. Almost no day passes without citizens of African countries accusing their governments of reneging on their duties and making demands for their needs and interest to be served. The responses of the governments to these concerns relates to issues of capacity, rule of law, accountability and the nature of politics.

Politics on the continent has fast become a ‘zero sum game’ that shapes everything in society. While the political space has become the main arena for addressing development issues, it seems impossible for development issues to be championed while politicians focus on political games. The political sphere has been construed as the answer to the advancement of society, despite the fact that other spheres of society hold an equally critical role to play in the wellbeing of their citizens. Thus, the political arena in Africa has assumed the status of a wizardry machine that holds the magic wand to unleashing development.
Though the political arena is not the only forum through which governance issues can be addressed, it is characterised by a lot of violence. Violence is used to protest dissatisfaction with the way governance is done and as a response to acts of repression from the state. Partisan politics has become a form of ‘aggressive participation’ (Muller, 1979) as evidenced by the violent nature of many elections in Africa. This violence is of ‘high-intensity’ or ‘high-intensity’ in nature (Bob-Milliar, 2014 pp. 135-142). Low-intensity violence is ‘localised spontaneous actions which are contentious, aggressive, confrontational, and violent’ (Bob-Milliar, 2014, p.135), such as the kind witnessed in Ghana and Zambia. Conversely, high-intensity political violence is depicted by the ‘the kinds witnessed in Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Kenya, and Cote d’Ivoire [which] are not comparable to those that occurred in Ghana or elsewhere in Africa’ (Bob-Milliar, 2014). Widespread violence erupted after keenly contested elections in Kenya in December 2007, for example (Kagwanja and Southall, 2009). In Cote d’Ivoire, it was a battle between the armed forces and ‘rebels’ that determined the legitimate winner of the November 2010 elections. Countries such as Ghana, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe have also witnessed pockets of violence during recent elections. This may be attributed to the seeming absence of programmatic and ideological political parties in Africa, or the unquenchable desire of politicians to engage in rent-seeking and patronage activities. The violent nature of partisan competition underscores the fact that partisan politics is interpreted as critical to enhance the general wellbeing of citizens.

Violence associated with politics is orchestrated by the citizens’ dissatisfaction with issues of governance and development. People use violence to express popular discontent, for instance, in the form of protest marches or demonstrations, with the way governance occurs in their respective countries. Recent examples are offered by protests in Burkina Faso to oust President Blaisé Campoare, popular upheavals in Ashaiman, Ghana, to protest against the degraded state of roads, or the series of demonstrations in Malawi and Uganda against widespread corruption and human rights abuses.

Participation in politics in Africa is premised on the cliché of ‘what for what’? Engagement in partisan politics can be understood as citizens entering into a relationship of exchange with a party driven by the expectation of rewards, a mechanism which can undermine self-governance. According to Bob-Milliar (2012), the main reason why the politically active decide to participate in partisan politics is to secure their economic livelihoods and progress in society. People thus view their participation in partisan politics, whether it is voting for a particular political party or acting as a polling officer during general elections, as rendering services in exchange for a reward. And when rewards are not offered, the party pays the price of losing in the elections. Gyimah-Boadi (2007) contends that this expectation drives patronage politics, which are seen as undermining the practice of effective self-governance. Gyimah-Boadi’s criticism does not seem to reflect the thinking of the masses. As reported by Bob-Milliar (2011) in an article analysing support for the popular National Democratic Congress (NDC) in northwest Ghana, the people of the region ‘owe unflinching allegiance to the party because of the responsiveness to their needs’ (pp. 456-466).

This view is not limited to the Upper West region of Ghana. Voter patterns in general elections in Ghana suggest that regions largely vote en-bloc for a particular political party on the basis of the inhabitants’ assessment of the party’s response to their needs (Morrison, 2004; Lindberg and Morrison, 2008). It is thus not surprising, as news reports suggest, that during a recent durbar (a gathering of the chiefs and people of an area), Nene Sakite II, the Konor of the Manya Krobo area in Eastern Ghana, openly declared support for the NDC’s second term bid from the people of his area on the basis of the party’s delivery of development projects to the region. The Konor noted that the region had missed out on projects for a long time (StarFmonline.com, 2014). Similar patterns exist across the continent. For instance in Zambia, a number of traditional rulers pledged their support for the Patriotic Front in the just ended Presidential by-election, citing on-going development projects as their reason for doing so. However, counter to Gyimah-Boadi politics of patronage argument, this should be viewed as providing services for a service.

Thus, when citizens vote, they expect their elected representatives to reciprocate their gesture by meeting their needs. These expected rewards may be both personal and collective, but, more importantly, voters expect a general improvement in social, economic and political dimensions. They expect public office holders and institutions
to implement policies that bring incremental improvements to their daily lives. They expect public institutions to render real time services to them. Their primary concern is not so much about the means of providing such public goods in as much as it does not lead to depriving others of their entitlement. For a change in governance to be realised, actors in the governance process must change how they view their role and act accordingly. Actors at different social strata, including the civil service, other governmental and quasi-governmental institutions, the private sector and the individual, must see their function in the governance process as rendering services in exchange for receiving others. For instance, the civil or public servant must see the office she occupies in any ministry, department and agency as providing services to the citizenry - her most valued client - and perform this function dutifully. In return, she is not only rewarded with improved conditions of service at the personal level, but with a secure and progressive society for all.

The notion of governance as service for a service does not imply that the liberal tenets such as institutionalism, rule of law, respect for human rights and constitutionalism upon which the current practice of self-governance in Africa rests should be abandoned: it suffices to say freedoms of movement, association and expression; universal adult suffrage; accountability; and the institutionalisation of 'formal' institutions remain very much relevant. However, the daily needs of the masses are rarely met by current governance structures. With the current 'Africa rising' proponents pointing to progress being made on the continent on the social, economic and political fronts, there are still monumental deficits in the areas of education, health, transport and communication, food security, peace and security, justice and equity in society among others. Efforts at meeting these needs are slow and there is a feeling, rightly so, among the populace that the current dispensation is for a privileged few groups of elites.

Leadership at all levels of society is vital, especially on the part of the elite class, if Africa is to indeed 'rise'. As citizens who have acquired the necessary knowledge in various disciplines from around the globe that is crucial to national development, elites should capitalise on their knowledge and exchange influence with other sections of society to harness the capacity of all citizens for development. The utilisation of their acquired knowledge must take place within the culture of the people they seek to serve. By this, they are better placed to elicit the cooperation needed for effective self-governance and development.

THE EFFECT OF GLOBALISATION ON SELF-GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA

Globalisation in its present form presents a double-edged phenomenon. The present-day interdependence between states presents, more than ever before, both opportunities and challenges. There is a burning desire on the continent for development that will put African countries in their rightful place among the comity of nations. One sure means to achieving this is through the practice of effective self-governance that responds to the needs of the citizenry. However, the achievement of self-governance must overcome a number of dilemmas, the most fundamental of which is globalisation: the internationalisation and intensification of economic, political, social and cultural relations across national borders (Abrahamsen, 2000, p. 8). Globalisation presents opportunities for the inter-borrowing of ideals that shape and sustain development and self-governance. On the other hand, it also presents a major obstacle. It hinders the ability of governments to make autonomous decisions in a highly connected global system where states are under constant pressure to conform to international norms. The advancement in communication technology, epitomised by the emergence of numerous social media platforms, has brought the world within reach with a click of a button. This advancement in information sharing has eroded the autonomy and independence of the nation-state in Africa more than ever before.

The seamless environment within which national governmental, non-governmental and inter-governmental institutions make decisions is more likely to infringe on the choices and alternatives available to African governments. In an increasingly connected international capitalist system of unequal relations, African governments are faced with decision-making powers outside of their direct control. Their decisions more often than not are based on the pressures of international capitalist and governmental organisations and are made in order to gain acceptance within the international system, rather than to accomplish what is most necessary for the local context.
Nevertheless, globalisation has also empowered citizens on the continent with information from across nations. This has made it easier for them to mount pressures on their respective governments in demand for better delivery of public services for the common good.

**CONCLUSION**

Africa's self-governance has made little progress toward meeting the needs and aspirations of the masses, even two and a half decades after the second wave of independence in the 1990s. The current practice of self-governance on the continent has mainly achieved three things. Firstly, continued Western hegemonic control under the guise of selected application of the good governance label to further their strategic geo-political and economic interest; secondly, a stronger integration of African economies into the world capitalist system for the development of the Global North; and thirdly, the legitimisation of politics within a few privileged elite groupings, who continue to benefit from state resources in furtherance of their own interest.

This paper has argued that there is the need for a radical shift in the practice of self-governance in Africa and how it is understood. Governance is the process through which a society articulates its set goals and mediates differences through a laid-down set of institutions and procedures collectively agreed on. It must be seen as the delivery of services within an open-ended process that allows for continuous feedback and improvement while the goals of society are constantly redefined. Actors involved in the process must play their respective roles and play them well. Self-governance as service delivery should not be viewed as synonymous with service delivery in the private sector, though they are both underpinned by the same principles. To this end, the tenets that underpin the current practice of self-governance are not in themselves negative, but there is a need to refocus how they are practiced.

Globalisation presents important challenges that African governments will have to address. Governments must work to achieve a balance between finding acceptance in the global system and adopting pragmatic policy approaches to solving the teething development challenges on the continent, especially in areas where such policy programmes may not conform to the frameworks of international organisations. A service-delivery approach to self-governance in Africa presents a more robust approach to meeting the monumental challenges of development confronting the state in Africa. This conception of governance better positions and orients institutions, states and persons in the governance process to offer effective services to the citizens. By this, states will be able to overcome some of the constraints posed by globalisation and enjoy a high sense of legitimacy.

For self-governance to address the peculiar needs of African societies, it must emerge from the daily realities of the people. This process must be shaped by those whose governance is at issue – the masses of the continent, such as illiterate people, the poor, and those struck by conflict, hunger and diseases. If this is steadfastly kept in focus and governance is approached as service delivery, then self-governance will be better enhanced and sustained for the common good. In this context, leadership at all levels, especially from political, social and economic elites, will be key to achieving the long-awaited development of the continent.

**REFERENCES**


