

# Politicisation of the federal civil service in Brazil:

## An empirical assessment

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### Abstract

This paper presents an empirical assessment of the level of politicisation of the Brazilian civil service in recent administrations using publicly available data. First, the paper discusses how the concept of politicisation applies to the Brazilian reality and analyses how low-level and high-level offices show different patterns of appointment. Second, the paper analyses variations in politicisation strategies, such as the creation of new appointment positions and the appointment of outsiders to public office. Finally, the paper shows how the extent of politicisation changes according to political cycles, especially party changes, at the presidential level.

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## INTRODUCTION - POLITICISATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS

In 1848, Mauricio Nabuco, a Brazilian politician, wrote a piece in a local paper denouncing the state of public affairs in his home state of Pernambuco:

“(.. .) these mass dismissals, from the chief to the porter, from the colonel to the corporal, from the judge to the bailiff, this removability of employees with which it is impossible to acquire the experience of public service and to preserve its traditions, with which it is impossible that there be special men and experienced workers, this removability is opposed to the stability that distinguishes the monarchy.” (Nabuco, 2010, p. 350)

More than 150 years later, his call against patronage practices still echoes in Brazilian newspapers (O Globo, 2011). A large number of the total public office appointments, including those of senior civil service positions in the government, are done through presidential or ministerial appointment, instead of merit-based criteria. In their negotiations with the executive, congressional party leaders make demands for appointments, for cabinet as well as senior and mid-level positions, based on personal affiliations. Op-eds in Brazilian papers criticise the appointment process in Brazil for being plagued by practices like *aparelhamento* (the use of state resources by the president’s party for partisan ends) and *loteamento* (the division and distribution of public offices to different coalition party feuds). This, according to them, is reducing the whole political game to cheap political bargains, better expressed by the expression *toma lá, dá cá*.

Recent research, however, suggests that the Brazilian federal civil service is more stable and qualified than this stereotypical view suggests. The Brazilian civil service usually ranks highly among Latin American countries on merit scales (Grindle, 2010; Longo, 2006). Further, sample surveys of high-level appointees show that a majority of them have experience in government and are highly educated (D’araújo, 2009). New measures of state capacity also show that a number of governmental agencies have recently strengthened their levels of career and specialisation (Bersch et al., 2012).

This paper aims to contribute a more nuanced examination of the Brazilian civil service by addressing the issue of politicisation – understood as the level of discretion exercised by elected officials in public personnel policies, especially the appointment to public office – of the Brazilian civil service. Politicisation can be considered as an important feature of democratic regimes: allowing presidents to staff their administrations is, in principle, a legitimate way of assuring the responsiveness of bureaucratic agencies to citizens’ policy preferences as expressed in the electoral process. However, depending on its range and scope, politicisation of the civil service can have negative consequences for government effectiveness and the strength of democratic institutions. Thus, studying this subject further is essential to elucidate answers on how to strike a balance between the two aforementioned issues that are important to democracy and public administration.

Using recent data, the paper analyse some politicisation strategies, such as the creation of new positions, appointment of outsiders to public office and different patterns of appointment shown in low and high-level offices used by Brazilian Presidents. The paper also shows how the extent of politicisation changes according to the political cycles, including party changes at the presidential level.

## THE CONCEPT OF POLITICISATION

According to Rouban (2003), politicisation “means that not only a civil servant’s activity but also his or her career depend more on political than professional norms defined by the administrations and ruled by law” (p. 313).

Peters and Pierre (2004b) have provided another, somewhat more specific definition. They argue that politicisation of the public service entails “*the substitution of merit-based criteria for political criteria in the selection, retention, promotion, rewards and disciplining of members of the public service*” (p. 2). They also claim that, “*unlike the use of patronage appointments in many less developed countries (...), politicisation in industrialized democracies implies attempts to control policy and implementation, rather than just supply jobs to party members or members of a family or clique*” (p. 2). This conceptualisation, centred as it is on “industrialized democracies” that exclude Brazil and other “emergent” societies, presents some problems when one tries to apply it to a more diverse set of countries. The term “substitution” implies that a pre-existing merit-based system is being politicised; but in many countries, including Brazil, this all-encompassing merit system was never in place to begin with.

For the purpose of this paper, level of politicisation of public service is considered as the level of discretion exercised by elected officials in the process of selection, retention, promotion, rewards or disciplining of members of the public service. The more these processes depend on the will of politicians, the more politicised the administration is; alternatively, the more impersonal and rules-based they are, the less politicised it is.

By choosing to work with this definition, the paper explicitly rejects the notion that politicisation can be understood and measured solely by the level of party affiliation of public officials. What is essential, in fact, is the range and scope of the power held by politicians over members of public service concerning the personnel policies and an assessment of the legally imposed limits to that power, as well as the effects of this arrangement on governmental effectiveness and democratic accountability.

## CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICISATION

As Peters and Pierre (2004b) note, there exists a “dominant assumption” that politicisation has predominantly negative consequences, especially in making the civil service less efficient. This line of reasoning goes back to Woodrow Wilson’s classic defence of the merit-based institutions in the American public administration (Wilson, 1887).

The consequences may, in fact, be varied. In some instances, appointed managers may be considered ill-suited for the jobs they hold, lacking the necessary expertise or experience. Further, frequent short job tenures are also a cause of concern for some specialists, since they can hinder long term planning and interagency coordination and teamwork. Moreover, politicisation may lower the morale of career bureaucrats, who may grow cynical over time after serving under the supervision of appointed officials. Finally, the legitimacy of the bureaucracy itself may suffer as the partisan use of state resources erodes public trust in the government (Gallo and Lewis, 2010; Lewis, 2008; Lewis, 2009; Peters and Pierre, 2004b; Peters, 2004).

Measuring these effects empirically is not an easy task. One difficulty lies in accounting for individual characteristics of agencies, the political system, political context, and other possible variables that might influence the performance of the agency. It is also hard to measure and compare the performance of different agencies. Recent research regarding appointments in the American Federal Government agencies found that increasing politicisation by ten percentage points decreased the PART score (a measure of goal achievement used by the Office of Management and Budget) of the agency by four to five percentage points on a 0-100 scale (Lewis, 2008). The study identifies the two attributes more associated to careerists that may account for the appointee-careerist performance gap- previous bureau experience and length of tenure. It is interesting to note that, on an average, outsiders were better educated than careerists. Politicisation may also be a useful tool for leaders to assure that their policy preferences, indicative of those of the citizens in the electoral process, are respected and followed by the bureaucracy. As a recent study puts it:

“in their quest for legitimacy, democratic regimes find themselves having to balance two values that can be in some tension: fair and non-politically partisan public service delivery and, subject to the law, the responsiveness of public servants to the policies of the current executive”. (Matheson, 2007)

This is important because career bureaucrats may have, or may develop over time, policy preferences that differ from most citizens as expressed in their electoral choices, which could lead to problems for democratic accountability. Therefore, exerting political control over the bureaucracy is an important and legitimate part of governing in modern democracies. As Peters and Pierre (2004b) point out, “*in some ways political criteria may be more important for assuring democratic values than ... conventional merit values*” (p. 3). Appointing outsiders to senior positions in the state can have other positive effects. As Grindle (2010) has pointed out in her analysis of patronage practices in Latin America:

“the ability to colonize often rigid or ineffective bureaucratic organizations with those who share commitment to new policy agendas or to bring highly qualified technocrats and skilled professionals into the public service in short order are valued opportunities for many reform-oriented presidents and their ministers.” (Grindle, 2010, p. 2).

Expertise and political affinity are not mutually exclusive criteria. As Guy Peters (2004) has noted, in the United States “the issue is now generally not expertise or political reliability, but rather expertise and political affinity with the administration” (p. 129). Since the President’s main concern is the implementation of her agenda, the appointment of qualified professionals grows in importance. The sheer complexity—legal, technical and political—of the responsibilities associated with many of the positions in contemporary public administration makes appointing unqualified loyalists an unattractive choice for Presidents.

## POLITICISATION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE IN BRAZIL: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT

This research paper aims to provide possible answers to questions such as how politicised is the Brazilian civil service and under what political circumstances does politicisation increase or decrease. To this end, the paper makes use of data downloaded from Transparency Portal, the official government website with information on all federal public servants and appointees, tenure, type and level of public office, and their relation to federal agencies. The paper also uses digital editions of the Personnel Statistics Bulletin, published monthly by the Federal Government since 1996 with consolidated data on the federal workforce and appointees.

The Federal Constitution of 1988 established a fairly rigid regime for the Brazilian civil service. All admissions of public employees have to be made by entrance exams – *concursos públicos*, with the selection based exclusively on the performance in theoretical tests and academic qualifications. Statutory public servants (all stable civil servants whose contracts became regulated by the same statute, the Unique Juridical Regime) are granted relevant rights, such as *estabilidade*, which means they cannot be fired except in exceptionally rare cases; and *isonomia*, according to which servants performing the same job or belonging to the same stage of a career cannot receive different salaries. These constitutional principles apply to all Brazilian governmental agencies. At the same time, Brazilian Presidents have, at their disposal, broad powers to deal with personnel matters. Appointments to thousands of positions are made at the discretion of the minister or the President, and in many cases with few or no requisites to be met by the appointees. All managerial positions are filled by appointment; no public office is attained by the merit-based criteria. The President can also make discretionary use of gratifications (*gratificações de representação*) to complement the salaries of selected employees, and provide additional compensations (*jetons*) to public office holders, who are at the same time appointed to the boards of state companies.


### The Superior Direction and Advisory (DAS) System

The military government in 1970 implemented the Superior Direction and Advisory (DAS) system, with little change to date. DAS offices are commonly referred to as *cargos de confiança* (offices of trust) and the appointees are regarded as recipients of the Minister's or President's personal trust along with being responsible for high-level decision making and advice (D'araújo, 2009). All the positions in the system are allotted by appointment and not based on set regulations or merit-based criteria.

In practice, there are different levels of DAS offices, with distinct attributes. DAS from levels 1 to 3 are low-level positions, with little policy or managerial responsibility. In some cases, they serve to improve the compensation of selected public employees, a useful human resources function, considering the rigid procedure demanded by the Unique Juridical Regime. Offices classified as DAS-4 are mid-level positions – general coordinators, division heads, and some chiefs of staff. Appointments of DAS Level 1 to Level 4 are made by the minister to whom they report. The offices directly responsible for high-level decision-making and advice are DAS-5, DAS-6, and Special Nature (NES) offices. To illustrate the distinction between them clearly, Figure 1 depicts the organizational chart of the Ministry of Communications in the year 2013. The highest position below the Minister is the Executive Secretary (an NES office), a very important position in the Federal Government, since she is the second in command in the Ministries and is responsible for “making the machine work”, managing the Ministry's budget, and having in some cases, broad powers of administrative decision by delegation of the Minister. Appointments for all NES offices, including Executive Secretaries, are made directly by the President of the Republic.

DAS-5 and DAS-6 are other important positions and include the Secretaries responsible for specific areas of policy (DAS-6), as well as the Directors of Departments that respond to the Secretaries (DAS-5). These key positions shape policy implementation. Appointments to DAS-5 and DAS-6 offices are made by the Civil Cabinet Head (*Chefe da Casa Civil*). This means that for the DAS-5 and DAS-6 appointments, the Minister's choices for the highest offices that report to her must be negotiated with and can be vetoed by the President, which is also the case for NES offices.

Figure 1. Organisational chart and office levels - Ministry of Communications



Source: Compiled by the author based on the Personal Statistics Bulletin.

### Creation of new DAS positions

Presidents often create new positions, which is another important politicisation move, as documented by previous research (Lewis, 2008). In Brazil, new DAS offices must be created by Executive Initiative and the Congress is prohibited to initiate legislation on the matter; existing offices, on the other hand, can be ‘transferred’ from one agency to another by Executive Decree, including complete changes to the job title and description (but not to the level in the DAS system).

All recent Brazilian governments have created new positions in the civil service; the total number of DAS offices increased from 18.374 in 2002 to 22.673 in 2013. Given the growth observed in the total federal workforce in the period, the proportion of DAS appointees to the total workforce has remained strikingly constant at around 3.5 per cent (refer Table 2). The number of high-level appointees, however, has increased by 58 per cent, from 826 at the end of Cardoso’s government, in 2002, to 1.309 today.

Table 1. Number of DAS positions at the end of the President's term

	Cardoso (1999- 2002)	Da Silva (2003- 2006)	Da Silva (2007- 2010)	Rousseff (2011-2014)*
<b>Lower Level (DAS 1 To 4)</b>	17.548	18.661	20.616	21.420
<b>Higher Level (DAS 5 and 6)</b>	826	1.136	1.254	1.309
<b>Total DAS</b>	18.374	19.797	21.870	22.729
<b>Total Workforce</b>	530.662	573.341	630.542	662.460
<b>DAS (as % Of Workforce)</b>	3.5%	3.5%	3.5%	3.4%

Data from July 2014.

Source: Compiled by the author, based on the Official Personnel Statistics Bulletin.

To understand why new DAS positions are created, it may be noted that in the American context, Presidents create appointed positions to increase their control over bureaucrats whose policy preferences are presumed to be divergent from theirs, leading in some cases to a “thickening’ of the federal civil service” (Lewis, 2008; Light, 1995). Presently, there is no data available that would assert this for Brazil: the statistics available from years before 2012 (from the Personnel Statistics Bulletins) only provide the total numbers of DAS without specifying the distribution across different agencies and Ministries. There is, however, reason to believe that an important factor for the observed increase in DAS positions is simply the expansion of government. The proportion of DAS offices to the total federal workforce has remained stable. Further, it must also be noted that DAS positions allow for a convenient way of staffing new agencies and Ministries. Finally, the number of Ministries (and Secretaries) granted “ministerial status” increased markedly in the Lula and Rousseff administrations, from 24 in 2002 to 39 in 2014, which certainly helps to account for the marked increase in higher level appointees.

Another interesting aspect in the creation of DAS positions is their relation to the political cycle. In the American case, party changes in the White House can lead to an initial decline of politicisation, followed by a long-run increase (Lewis, 2008). It is also useful to note that,

“(…) incoming presidents can count on fewer holdovers, and the process of filling out management teams across the government is slowed by the distractions of the transition, by bargaining among factions over patronage, and by the learning process associated with taking control. If the incoming party has been out of power for a period of time, the pool of available appointees may be smaller.” (Lewis, 2008, p. 124)

For the first time since its creation in 1980, the Worker’s Party (PT) in Brazil won the presidential election in 2002. As Table 3 shows, the total number of appointees in 2003 fell by 4.4 per cent. This is consistent with the literature on the subject (Lewis, 2008) and with the Brazilian government case, as one considers the sheer number of appointments to be made and the natural suspicions regarding the policy preferences of previous DAS office holders by the new government officials. In the following year, the fall was more than compensated with an increase in the number of appointees by 8.7 per cent, a rather quick recovery. Not only were the vacant DAS spots filled, but also new positions were created by the new administration.

Looking at what happens in case of no party-change at the presidential level, it can be noted that during Cardoso’s re-election in 1998, there were two consecutive years of decline (2.4 per cent in 1998 and 5.1 per

cent in 1999), which are better explained by the strict fiscal measures taken at the time due to an economic crisis. As the economy got better, a number of DAS offices were 'liberated' for appointments, which helps explain the 6.6 per cent increase in the year 2000.

**Table 2. Yearly variation in the total number of appointees**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Variation</b>
1998	-2.4%
1999	-5.1%
2000	6.6%
2001	3.5%
2002	2.1%
2003	-4.4%
2004	8.7%
2005	4.4%
2006	-0.6%
2007	2.0%
2008	2.0%
2009	3.0%
2010	3.1%
2011	1.1%
2012	1.3%
2013	1.2%

Source: Compiled by the author, based on Official Personnel Statistic Bulletin.

A small decline can be observed in the election year 2006 (0.6 per cent), around Lula Da Silva's re-election, which could possibly be explained by appointees leaving the government to work on political campaigns or to run for public office, and whose positions remained unfilled. In the following years, however, the number of appointees grew; one possible reason could be the creation of new ministries, as well as the expansion of the governmental workforce in this period. The transition from the Lula to Rousseff's administration, both from the same party (PT), is observed mainly as a slowing down of the growth in DAS positions. The growth in DAS positions is now at an annual rate of 1.2 per cent, about half of the rate observed in Da Silva's second term.

### **Appointment of outsiders**

Appointment of professionals from outside the public service for higher positions is generally considered a more robust measure of the politicisation of public service than creation of appointed positions. Having top positions open to external appointment means the President does not have to depend on bureaucrats who do not share her policy preferences.

The fact that politicisation is accepted as part of the political landscape does not mean that there is a lack of concern regarding the possible negative consequences on the effectiveness of the government. A President inevitably depends on the expertise and qualification of government workers, and when political considerations take precedence over technical ones, the delivery of public services can be severely affected. The short tenures

of appointees, imposed by political cycles, can make planning more difficult and can lower agency-commitment to long-term goals. Lack of familiarity with the public service, with its peculiar regulations, procedures, and political logic, can also be an impediment to outsiders. Contemporary empirical studies in the United States show that agencies run by external appointees not only have worse performance than those run by careerists, but also that agencies run by former electoral campaign staffers perform worse than other appointees (Gallo and Lewis, 2010; Krause et al., 2006; Lewis, 2008; Lewis, 2009).

Discussing the appointment of outsiders in the Brazilian Federal Government is a more complicated task than it may seem, as it depends on critical factors such as the definition of "outsider" – which may refer those outside the specific agency, or outside the federal civil service more broadly. Given the high level of mobility that is provided by the DAS system, this is an important distinction. This paper considers outsiders as those appointed professionals who do not belong to the stable corps of the federal civil service, including state companies, autarchies, public foundations, and regulatory agencies. Further, the paper analyses the different patterns of appointment of federal civil servants, including whether they are from the same agency to which they were appointed.

Table 3 shows the distribution of DAS offices by origin of appointees. There seems to be a distinct difference in pattern for low and mid-level offices, on the one hand, and for high-level ones, on the other. Low and mid-level positions are primarily appointed from the federal civil servants of the agency corps itself, contributing 59.6 per cent of positions at this level whereas, only 9.4 per cent of low and mid-level appointees are from a different agency inside the federal government. However, 31 per cent of positions are filled by people with no connection to the federal public service including 6297 appointees with no connection to any type of civil service, and 381 that belong to bureaucratic corps of some other sphere or branch of government.

**Table 3. DAS Appointees by origin and level of public office**

Origin	Low And Mid-Level Offices (Das 1 To 4)	%	High Level Offices (Das 5, Das 6, NES)	%	Total	%
<b>Federal Civil Service</b>	14.852	69.0%	790	57.6%	15.642	68.3%
<b>Same Agency</b>	12.827	59.6%	327	23.8%	13.154	57.4%
<b>Different Agency</b>	2.025	9.4%	463	33.7%	2.488	10.9%
<b>Civil Service- Other</b>	381	1.8%	119	8.7%	500	2.2%
<b>Outside Civil Service</b>	6.297	29.2%	463	33.7%	6.760	29.5%
<b>Total</b>	<b>21.530</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>1.372</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>22.902</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: Portal da Transparência, December 2013.

The existence of thousands of appointed outsiders to low-level public offices seems to be a legitimate cause of concern, since most of these are posts that demand low levels of expertise and responsibility. Moreover, the persistence of this feature over time, during different administrations, suggests that this may be an easy mode of patronage: offering 'jobs for the boys', as the American expression goes.

Looking further at the appointments at high-level DAS offices, the first important difference observed is the relatively low proportion of bureaucrats directing their own agencies; only 23.8 per cent appointees are selected from the same agency corps. This could represent an active effort of the President to control the bureaucracy

by favouring civil servants from other ministries or federal agencies (33.7 per cent) or from outside the federal civil service (42.4 per cent), who are less attached to the agency's policy preferences and more responsive to Presidential designs. In a sense, this could be considered as a measure of how the balance of power in the Brazilian federal civil service favours the Presidency as opposed to the power of individual agencies' bureaucracies. This interpretation, however, must be taken with a grain of salt. In many cases, agencies, or even ministries, simply lack public servants with the required qualifications. In these cases, it may not be reasonable for the President to appoint civil servants from the agency, as this could worsen agency performance.

Time-series data on high-level offices from Table 4 may help establish connections between types of appointment and the political cycle. In the last 15 years, the top administrative posts in the Federal Government have always been filled by a mix of federal civil servants (active and retired), on the one side, and outsiders—including civil servants from other branches and spheres of government—on the other. The data shows clearly the effects that changes of party in charge of government can have on the top layers of a highly politicised civil service like the Brazilian Federal Government. As of 2002, the last year of the Cardoso administration, federal civil servants (active and retired) accounted for 54.8 per cent of the top governmental positions while the remaining 45.2 per cent were outsiders. After Lula's election, the proportions change considerably. In 2003, outsiders represented 59.6 per cent of all high-level appointees, and federal civil servants accounted for 40.4 per cent.

These figures seem consistent with recent findings (Lewis, 2008) on party changes in the USA. Politicians from the Workers' Party (PT) in Brazil, when elected to National Executive power for the first time, had reasons to distrust the policy preferences and political loyalties of many federal bureaucrats, especially the ones who had occupied DAS offices in the previous administration. One obvious strategy was to recruit managers who had served under several municipal and state administrations run by PT at the time. This helps explain the increase in civil servants from other spheres of government from 11.7 per cent in 2002 to 16.6 per cent in 2003.

Table 4. Appointments to high-level offices in the Federal Civil Service

Year	Federal Civil Servants	Retired Fed. Civil Servants	Civil Servants - Other	Do Not Belong To Civil Service
1998	41.9%	15.4%	12.8%	29.9%
1999	42.0%	12.4%	13.4%	32.1%
2000	40.3%	13.7%	13.0%	33.0%
2001	41.5%	12.9%	12.2%	33.4%
2002	40.9%	13.9%	11.7%	33.4%
2003	32.5%	7.9%	16.6%	43.1%
2004	34.8%	7.2%	17.7%	40.3%
2005	36.1%	5.4%	18.2%	40.3%
2006	39.3%	4.7%	18.2%	37.9%
2007	42.2%	4.4%	18.6%	34.8%
2008	43.0%	4.6%	16.6%	35.8%
2009	45.5%	4.3%	15.2%	34.9%
2010	46.1%	4.9%	14.5%	34.4%
2011	49.5%	3.7%	14.9%	31.9%
2012	51.4%	3.8%	15.4%	29.4%

Source: Compiled by the author, based on the Official Personnel Statistic Bulletin.

It is interesting to note that the proportion of federal civil servants in high level appointments rose markedly during the next 10 years of the PT government, reaching similar levels in 2012 to the proportions observed during the Cardoso administration. As Lewis (2008) remarks regarding the American case:

“duration in office (...) provides the president and his subordinates time to learn more about the agency and the personnel at the agency who can work with the administration because of either similar policy views or a flexible bureaucratic ethos.” (Lewis, 2008, p. 91)

It is also important to note that, in the Lula administration, many bureaucratic careers were boosted with the *concurros*. There was little reason to distrust the loyalty of these recently hired bureaucrats, since they hadn't served under any of the other parties' administrations and were socialised in the federal government during PT's stay in power.

## CONCLUSION

This paper presented some preliminary findings on the level of politicisation of the Brazilian Federal Government, including measures of the level of politicisation, its relation to the electoral cycle and its consequences for the tenure of public officials. Our findings seem to confirm the highly politicised nature of the Brazilian civil service, given the enormous discretionary power of Presidents and Ministers to make appointments to public office. Even though federal civil servants fill most positions—under the DAS system they represent 68.3 per cent of total offices—thousands of outsiders have been appointed to high and low-level positions.

Historical data shows that since 1998, when information first became available, all Brazilian presidents have increased the number of appointees during their terms. One suggested reason is the expansion of the total federal government workforce; since the number of DAS appointees, as a proportion of the total workforce, has not changed substantially in this period. DAS positions are also used as a convenient way for creating new Ministries and agencies.

The available data includes only one instance of party change at the presidential level, in 2003, when the Lula administration (PT) succeeded the Cardoso (PSDB) administration. The information available seems to confirm some of the results observed by other researchers (Lewis, 2008) regarding the effects of party change in government on the level of politicisation, most notably an immediate increase in the proportion of outsiders in top positions. As the incumbent party stays in power for a longer period, the proportion of federal bureaucrats in the top positions increases.

Further research might help to answer important questions such as the different patterns of politicisation between agencies, the differences in expertise, experience, policy preferences, and party affiliation between federal civil servants and outsiders, the difference between policy and patronage objectives on the patterns of politicisation, and the possible effects of politicisation on government effectiveness and performance. There is also tremendous scope for research on the politicisation of regulatory agencies and state companies in Brazil.

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